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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
It is general opinion that high assurance systems present challenging user 
interfaces.  Therefore users tend to use untrusted, low assurance systems that do not 
provide sufficient security.  The MYSEA project incorporates both high and low 
assurance systems with trusted and untrusted applications.  The high assurance system 
used in the MYSEA project is the DigitalNet XTS-400.  This system provides high 
assurance enforcement of policies to protect information from both unauthorized 
disclosure and unauthorized modification.  Both commercial-off-the-shelf and open 
source productivity applications are provided to gain user acceptability.   
  The MYSEA project currently provides logon services for users in a multilevel 
secure LAN.  These services require trusted devices at the client systems that are not 
available to the users on the single level networks. The motivation for porting OpenSSH 
is to provide users with remote access to the XTS-400 from a single level network. 
The methodology used for this research involved platform analysis, source code 
analysis, source code modifications, debugging and integration testing.  The XTS-400 
provides a Linux Binary Compatible Interface.  In most cases, applications developed in 
Linux will run on the XTS-400 with no modifications.  OpenSSH is a special case, where 
the source code had to be modified and the modified source code had to be tested to 
ensure there was no major loss in functionality.  Although some functionality was lost in 
the porting process, the goal of providing a secure remote interactive session to the user 
across the single level LAN was achieved.  Users are constrained by the security policies 
enforced on the XTS-400 when they are logged in through OpenSSH as verified by the 
developmental testing results.   
The conclusion of this study offers suggestions for future projects to extend this 



























A. MOTIVATION OF STUDY 
In military and commercial contexts, information may be classified according to 
its criticality to its owners.  The classification process involves labeling information with 
sensitivity levels.  For the Military, the standard levels are UNCLASSIFIED, 
CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET.  In commerce, the levels might be 
PUBLIC, PROPRIETARY, and SENSITIVE.  The use of these classifications is intended 
to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the information requiring protection.  As a 
military example, military plans must be kept confidential so as to defeat opposing 
forces.  If the opposing forces discovered a secret military operational plan, then they 
could counter that operation and our military forces would suffer great losses in the form 
of lives, equipment, and technology.  For a commercial example consider the following:  
information regarding a product of a company is labeled proprietary and this information 
is not intended for public dissemination; its disclosure, perhaps to competitors, could 
cause a company to lose its market edge and ultimately money.   
Sensitive information needs sufficient protection, but access to this information 
needs to be granted when appropriate.  What is required is a multilevel secure (MLS) 
architecture.  One such architecture is the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) 
project.  The MYSEA project incorporates the protection mechanisms required to ensure 
only the authorized disclosure of information to authorized users.  So far, the MYSEA 
project has focused on the military sector, but it can also be used in the commercial sector 
with little modification.  To facilitate the sharing of information with appropriate and 
authorized uses, the MYSEA project permits access from a MLS local area network 
(LAN) to one of several single level networks.  To aid in the sharing of information, a 
service was required so that users on the single level networks could access resources 
with the multilevel network. 
The motivation for this study is to provide secure remote login capabilities for use 
over the single level networks in support of the Monterey Security Architecture 
(MYSEA) project.  The MYSEA project uses the XTS-400 as its multilevel secure server 
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called the MYSEA server.  The MYSEA server is connected to a number of single level 
networks and a MLS LAN.  From the MLS LAN, users can use the Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE) devices to connect to the MYSEA server and view information at 
varying secrecy and integrity levels.  From the single level networks, only information 
that has the same security classification as that of the network may be seen on these 
networks.  Users on these networks do not have TPE devices to authenticate with the 
MYSEA server.  Hence there is a need to provide a secure login mechanism for those 
users.    The tool chosen to provide the remote interactive session is OpenSSH,  a 
network security application that uses the SSH protocols to implement secure remote 
login capabilities.   
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to port OpenSSH to the XTS-400 run on a multilevel 
secure (MLS) server to provide secure remote logins for users from different single-level 
networks.  The XTS-400 does not provide such a capability.  The XTS-400 provides a 
Linux Binary Compatible Interface that allows Linux programs to run on the XTS-400 
with little or no modifications [DIG03b].  This study includes source code modifications 
and a series of developmental tests used to demonstrate that OpenSSH provides a remote 
shell to the user and that the security policies enforced on the XTS-400 are still enforced 
through OpenSSH.  The organization for this study will now be discussed.   
C. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER 
This paper is organized as follows:  Chapter I provides the purpose, motivation 
and organization of this study.  Chapter II provides background information on the 
MYSEA project, OpenSSH, differences between OpenBSD and the XTS-400 and the 
software packages required by OpenSSH to function properly.  Chapter III covers the 
goals of this study, the methodology used to port OpenSSH, and the modifications made 
to the source code for OpenSSH.  Chapter IV describes the types of testing required for a 
software port and provides the test plans and the results for each type of test in the 
context of this study.  Chapter V provides a summary of this study, the lessons learned 





This chapter provides background information relating to this project.  The first 
section discusses the MYSEA project, and provides an overview of OpenSSH including 
its history, available clients, available authentication methods and its modes of operation.  
The second section provides information about the port of OpenSSH to the XTS-400.  
Within this section, features used by OpenSSH but have a different behavior on the XTS-
400 are discussed.  Then, the way the XTS-400 handles those features is discussed along 
with a brief description of security policies available on the XTS-400.  The last section 
will cover the software dependencies of OpenSSH. 
A. ARCHITECTURAL BACKGROUND 
1. MYSEA Project 
“[MYSEA] provides a trusted distributed operating environment for enforcing 
multilevel security policies, and utilization of support for incorporation of unmodified 
commodity productivity applications for user activities” [IRV04].  This means that the 
MYSEA project uses a client-server architecture where the server, called the MYSEA 
server, is responsible for the enforcement of security policies.  This server is one of the 
very few specialized hardware components required by MYSEA.  The other specialized 
hardware components are the Trusted Path Extensions (TPE) and the Trusted Channel 
Modules (TCM).  The TPE is a device that will provide an unforgeable communications 
link between the server and the client machine.  The TCMs authenticate network 
sensitivity levels to the MYSEA server so that the information received from that 
network may be labeled correctly.  The clients are intended to have no permanent 
writeable storage.  A Knoppix client as well as a specialized version of Microsoft 
Windows XP Embedded called “state-less professional” are part of the design. The use of 
a popular operating system such as Microsoft Windows supports user acceptance because 
users may continue to use their favorite, and familiar, office productivity applications.  
The MYSEA server uses an XTS-400 as its base.  It will be discussed in a future section. 
The XTS-400 provides an unforgeable communications link called a “trusted 
path” between the target of evaluation (TOE) security functions (TSF) and the user.  The 
TSF is “a set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be 
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relied upon for the correct enforcement of the [TOE security policy]” [DIG04]. The TOE 
in this context refers to the XTS-400.  The trusted path can be invoked by the user with a 
secure attention key (SAK).  The trusted path ensures to the user that he is 
communicating with the TSF and ensures to the TSF that it is communicating with the 
user.  Outside the context of the MYSEA project, the XTS-400 only allows users at the 
console or serial terminals to invoke the SAK to use the trusted path.  Within the context 
of the MYSEA project, the TPEs are high assurance components that allow users to login 
to the MYSEA server from a multilevel secure (MLS) LAN.  The TPEs are not available 
for use on single level LANs such as the NIPRNET, SIPRNET and JWICS.  There is a 
need to provide remote login capabilities with strong authentication over the single level 
LANs.  The remote login utility chosen is OpenSSH, which will be described in the next 
section. 
2. OpenSSH 
a. Overview of OpenSSH 
OpenSSH is the OpenBSD version of SSH, the secure shell.  It is available 
under the OpenBSD license [SSH04].  SSH – pronounced s-s-h – is a protocol that 
specifies a secure way to login to a remote host [BAR01].  The creator of the SSH 
protocol is Tatu Ylonen, a researcher at the Helsinki University of Technology in Finland 
[BAR01].  There are two versions of the protocol, SSH-1 and SSH-2.  SSH-1 was 
developed rather quickly and has numerous flaws [BAR01].  SSH-2 was developed to fix 
these flaws and add more functionality to the protocol [BAR01]. There is no backwards 
compatibility from SSH-1 to SSH-2[BAR01].  SSH-1 is also monolithic and tries to 
provide for confidentiality, integrity, authentication and communication of user 
commands and data within one single protocol.  According to Saltzer and Schroeder, a 
secure system should be very modular based on the principle of economy of mechanism 
[SAL75].  SSH-2 follows this recommendation and divides the protocol into three main 
components: SSH-TRANS, SSH-USERAUTH, and SSH-CONNECT.  In essence, SSH 
is a protocol and not an application; OpenSSH is an application that supports the SSH 
protocols. 
Applications based on SSH usually only support one protocol, either SSH-
1 or SSH-2. Thus certain clients may not be compatible with certain servers.  OpenSSH is 
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an application that incorporates both protocol versions.   OpenSSH clients and servers 
can negotiate with other clients and servers as to which protocol version to use.    
OpenSSH is the preferred implementation of SSH because it recognizes both versions of 
the protocol and it is highly portable – although the server must run on a Linux- or BSD-
like system. OpenSSH clients have been developed for many popular operating systems 
such as Microsoft Windows and the various Linux Distributions.   
  A discussion of the PuTTY OpenSSH client follows. 
b. SSH Clients 
There are numerous clients for OpenSSH as can be seen on 
http://www.freessh.org.  Under the Windows section of the website, 27 different listings 
can be found for clients that can be run on the Windows Operating System.  Some of 
these clients are freeware and others are shareware.  One popular Windows-based client 
is PuTTY. 
PuTTY is very modular; there are separate executables for about every 
function available to the OpenSSH client such as an SSH client, a telnet client, a secure 
copy and secure FTP client, a secure tunneling client and a key-generation client.  PuTTY 
is compatible with OpenSSH because like OpenSSH, it supports the two versions of the 
SSH protocol.  PuTTY was developed and is maintained by a small team lead by Simon 
Tatham in Cambridge, England [TAT04].  PuTTY was selected as the Windows SSH 
client for use in this study. 
c. Authentication 
One important requirement for remote logins is strong authentication.  
OpenSSH provides eight authentication mechanisms: none, public-key, RhostsRSA, 
Rhosts, password, s/key, Kerberos, and PAM. 
The first authentication method, none, does not perform any 
authentication.  It allows a user to login assuming the user supplies a valid username.  
This method is built into OpenSSH and is part of the default mode of operation for 
OpenSSH.  This method can be disabled by altering the OpenSSH daemon configuration 
to deny empty passwords. 
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  The public-key authentication method works in the following way: the 
server issues a numerical challenge to the client.  The client, acting on behalf of a user, 
must sign the challenge and send it back to the server.  The server then uses the user’s 
public key to verify the signature.  If the signature can be verified, the user is 
authenticated.  There are three types of keys used in OpenSSH: RSA, DSA and 
OpenPGP.  RSA keys are used by the RSA cryptosystem which was developed by Rivest, 
Shamir and Adelman [BAR01].  DSA, which stands for digital signature algorithm, has 
keys similar to RSA keys but this cryptosystem was developed by the U.S. National 
Security Agency and distributed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology through the digital signature standard because of patent restrictions on the 
RSA cryptosystem [BAR01].  OpenPGP is the free version of PGP.  PGP is the “pretty 
good privacy” cryptosystem developed by Phil Zimmerman [BAR01].  The default keys 
used for OpenSSH running under Version 2 of the SSH protocol are DSA keys.   
RhostsRSA is similar to public-key authentication but it only provides 
host authentication, not user authentication.  Each host generates a pair of RSA keys.  
The server then sends a numerical challenge to the client host and the client host must 
sign and send the message back to the server.  This method differs from the previous 
method because the user does not have to specify the key or its passphrase.   
Rhosts is a very insecure method of authentication; it involves creating a 
file that will allow a host listed in that file to establish a connection without any further 
authentication checks.  This is the method used by the rlogin, rsh, rcp commands.  In this 
method, when the server receives a connection, it checks the IP address and the hostname 
of the remote host against the “/etc/rhosts” file.  If the IP address and hostname are 
located in the file, the host is authenticated and the user is granted access to the server 
assuming that a valid username was supplied.  Rhosts is very insecure because it assumes 
that the client machine can protect itself from compromise.  If the machine is 
compromised, then the server could be compromised as well, because this authentication 
method does not require the user to prove their identity with a password or private key.   
The use of passwords has always been popular because users can 
remember passwords easily if they create them and there is no need to carry around a file 
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holding keys.  The drawback to passwords is usually if people generate their own, then 
they are often easy to guess.  In the case that the user is not allowed to generate their own 
password, then the user may not remember it as easily and will write it down, which 
could lead to the compromise of their account.   
S/key is a form of one-time password challenge-response authentication.   
The server issues a challenge in the form of a string of characters and the user can either 
enter the string into a device that will provide the response that the user enters into the 
command line and sends to the server or the user carries a list of pre-calculated 
passwords and provides the appropriate response to the server from the list.  Use of this 
authentication mechanism requires extra technology and devices.   
Kerberos is an authentication method where the user authenticates to a 
server and  receives a ticket that will grant  access to other servers as long as these servers 
have been configured to use and receive the Kerberos tickets.  This mechanism requires 
the installation and maintenance of a Kerberos server.   
OpenSSH also provides compatibility with the Pluggable Authentication 
Modules (PAM) developed by Sun Microsystems.  According to [BAR01], PAM “is an 
infrastructure for supporting multiple authentication methods.”    This allows for other 
authentication methods to be developed and used without modifying the OpenSSH source 
to directly implement the new method.  All that OpenSSH has to provide is support for 
PAM.   
d. Modes of Operation 
OpenSSH can run in one of two modes: with privilege separation and 
without privilege separation.  Privilege separation will be discussed in a later section, but 
first the need for it will be discussed. 
When OpenSSH first appeared, it only provided secure remote login capabilities 
by encrypting the network traffic and providing numerous authentication methods.  
OpenSSH followed a standard client–server architecture: the server, known as a daemon, 
would listen for connections on a specific Internet Protocol (IP) address and port and 
when a connection is received it would spawn a child to handle the requests of the client.  
Every client–server application is different and each server may run as a specific user or a 
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special user without login capabilities.  In a few special cases, the server needs to run as 
the root user because the server needs to execute some privileged commands.  OpenSSH 
falls into this last category. 
The OpenSSH daemon and its child need to possess privileges so that all client 
requests, such as password authentication, can be serviced.  In a Linux or UNIX 
environment, user identities and passwords are stored in two different files: “passwd” and 
“shadow” in the “/etc” directory.  The “passwd” file which stores information such as 
user name, user id, real name, home directory, and user path is normally readable by 
anyone on the system.  However, it is only writeable by the root user.  The “shadow” file 
contains the user id and password pairs for each user in an encrypted text format that is 
only readable by the root user.  In order for the OpenSSH child to authenticate the user 
using password authentication, it would have to access both the “passwd” and “shadow” 
files.  Thus, the OpenSSH child would have to run as the root user.  There are some 
vulnerabilities [PRO03] that can result in privilege escalation to the root user.  If root-
user status can be acquired maliciously, then the system is compromised and the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information on that system can no longer 
be guaranteed. 
A solution to combat this threat was needed.  Among the many proposed solutions 
that will mitigate the privilege escalation threat, one solution is the concept of privilege 
separation.  Privilege separation is a generic concept with the objective of “[reducing] the 
amount of code that runs with special privilege without affecting or limiting the 
functionality of the service” [PRO03].  The implementation of privilege separation 
requires the use of two processes, a parent with privileges and a child without privileges.  
The child handles all user transactions and when a user transaction requires privileges, 
the child must ask the parent to process the transaction for the child [PRO03].  Privilege 
separation has the benefit of confining an intruder, if they manage to compromise the 
child, to the child’s address space and prevents the inheritance of privileges.  The work 
done in [PRO03] proposed a framework for implementing privilege separation and 
OpenSSH was chosen as the test application that would demonstrate privilege separation.  
Privilege separation has now been fully integrated into OpenSSH and is a default option. 
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If privilege separation is disabled, then the OpenSSH daemon follows the 
standard client-server model, i.e., the daemon handles all user transactions.     
B. PORTING BACKGROUND 
In porting an application from one platform to another it is useful to know the 
differences between the original development platform and the target platform.  This 
section will discuss how the features required by OpenSSH  differ between OpenBSD 
and the XTS-400.   
1. BSD Discussion 
OpenSSH uses many features available on its development platform, OpenBSD.  
Many of these features are also available on many of the other platforms to which 
OpenSSH has been ported such as the various distributions of Linux.   Table 1 provides a 
description of the features used by OpenSSH that do not have the same behavior on the 
















Category Name Description 
root user a user with unlimited access to the system; 
all privileges are given to this user 
System 
Features 
file-descriptor passing ability for processes to pass file-descriptors 
to other processes 
chroot create a new root directory for a process 
setgroups sets the supplementary group IDs for a 
process 
initgroups initializes the supplementary group list 
socketpair creates a pair of UNIX domain sockets that 
are linked together 
setuid, seteuid, setreuid sets the real and effective user ID of a 
process 




daemon forks the process into the background and 
disconnects it from the controlling terminal 
passwd provides user information such as 
username, user ID, default group ID, home 
directory and shell 
shadow provides the user’s encrypted password 
utmp contains a record of users logged in to the 
system 
wtmp records all of the logins and logouts to the 
system 
System Files 
group provides information about the groups in 
the system and which users belong in each 
group 
Environment daemon environment the init process provides an environment 
for all processes 
Table 1. OpenBSD Features Used by OpenSSH 
The next section will discuss how these features are different on the XTS-400. 
2. XTS-400 
The XTS-400 provides a Linux Binary Compatible Interface.  This interface is not 
complete because not all features of Linux are supported through this interface.  
OpenSSH has been ported to numerous Linux distributions and is compatible with the 
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interface provided by the XTS-400.  However, not all features required by OpenSSH as 
presented in  Table 1 behave in the same way on the XTS-400 as they do in Linux or 
OpenBSD.  The differences in the features are listed in  Table 2. 
Category Name XTS-400 Implementation Difference 
the root user there is no root user on the XTS-400 System Features 
file-descriptor passing this feature is not implemented 
chroot there is an API, but there is no underlying 
system support 
setgroups there is an API, but there is no underlying 
system support 
initgroups there is an API, but there is no underlying 
system support 
socketpair there is an API, but there is no underlying 
system support 
setuid, seteuid, setreuid these system calls require the privilege: 
set_owner_group 
setgid, setgegid, setregid these system calls require the privilege: 
set_owner_group 
System Functions 
daemon there is an API, but there is no underlying 
system support 
passwd stub file provided for Linux 
compatibility, not used for XTS-400 
authentication 
shadow does not exist on the system 
utmp does not exist on the system 
wtmp does not exist on the system 
System Files 
group stub file provided for Linux compatibility 
Environment daemon environment no init process for daemons, daemons are 
started from the daemon database 
Table 2. XTS-400 Implementation Differences 
The features presented in  Table 1 are not the only differences between the XTS-
400 and other operating systems.  The XTS-400 differs from most popular operating 
systems because unlike Linux, which only enforces discretionary access control policies, 
the XTS-400 also enforces mandatory access control policies.  The XTS-400 enforces a 
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total of three policies: a mandatory secrecy policy, a mandatory integrity policy, and a 
discretionary policy.   
The mandatory secrecy policy is represented by the Bell and La Padula secrecy 
formal model.  This model prevents the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information 
by maintaining two properties: the simple security property and the *-property [BEL76].  
The simple security property prevents a subject from accessing an object if the secrecy 
level of the subject is dominated by the secrecy level of the object [BEL76] –this is 
referred to as read-up.  The *-property only allows write-access if the secrecy level of the 
object is equal to or dominates the secrecy level of the subject [BEL76].   
The mandatory integrity policy is represented by the Biba integrity formal model.  
This model prevents the unauthorized modification of information.  Like the previous 
model, this model also has two properties that must be maintained: the simple integrity 
property and the *-property [BIB77].  The simple integrity property does not allow for a 
subject to have observe-access to an object if the integrity level of the subject dominates 
the integrity level of the object [BIB77] – this is referred to as read-down.  The *-
property allows for write-access if the integrity level of the subject is equal to or 
dominates the integrity level of the object [BIB77].   
The discretionary access control policies are enforced by two mechanisms: access 
control lists (ACLs) and capability lists – referred to as subtypes in the context of the 
XTS-400.   For a detailed discussion of these two types of access control mechanisms, 
refer to [LAM74].   
The differences between the development and target platforms provided the 
greatest challenges in porting OpenSSH to the XTS-400.  Software dependencies created 
a few minor challenges for the port.  OpenSSH relies on other software packages and 
libraries in order to function.  These extra packages were not present on the XTS-400.  A 
discussion of these packages follows. 
C. SOFTWARE DEPENDENCIES 
According to [BAR01] and [SSH04], OpenSSH requires the following software in 
order for it to run: Zlib 1.1.4 or greater and OpenSSL 0.9.6 or greater.  Further inspection 
revealed that OpenSSL depends on a random number generator that is normally available 
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in Linux through the “/dev/random” or “/dev/urandom” device entries.  The XTS-400 
does not provide a kernelized random number generator; the above mentioned devices are 
not listed anywhere in the file system.  Both the OpenSSL and OpenSSH installation 
instructions recommended the use of either the PRNGd (pseudo random number 
generator daemon) or the EGD (entropy gathering daemon).  EGD was chosen for use 
because the PRNGd documentation referenced the EGD.  Installation instructions for 
these three software packages are in Appendix A of this report.  A discussion of these 
three packages will follow. 
1. Zlib 
Zlib 1.1.4 is a compression library with utilities.  OpenSSH and OpenSSL use zlib 
in order to compress data when communicating over a network.  The compression occurs 
before encryption so the delay in transmission due to encryption is reduced [BAR01].  
The use of compression is also a daemon runtime configuration option as can be seen in 
Appendix C: SSH daemon configuration file.  However, this file is not used until the SSH 
daemon executes.  Simply changing the option “Compression Yes” to “Compression No” 
will not stop the tests by the configuration file to look for the zlib libraries and header 
files.  In order to bypass the configuration file tests, either false libraries and header files 
would have to be created or the configuration file would have to be modified to not check 
for zlib.  After a quick analysis of the zlib documentation, it was determined that the 
installation of zlib would not be difficult.  In this case, it was easier to install the required 
software than to provide false libraries or modify the configuration file.   
2. OpenSSL 
OpenSSL is a project designed to provide “a robust, commercial-grade, full-
featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) 
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general 
purpose cryptography library” [SSL04].  The OpenSSL libraries and header files provide 
the cryptographic ciphers needed by OpenSSH to perform encryption.  Without the use of 
the libraries, then OpenSSH would be reduced to the ordinary telnet and file transfer 
protocols.  A quick glance at the XTS-400 “/lib” directory showed that the OpenSSL 
shared libraries were already installed; however, the OpenSSH configuration file did not 
accept the libraries.  Unlike zlib, this application is absolutely necessary in order for 
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OpenSSH to work, so simple file substitution was not an option and neither was 
modifying the configuration file.  A quick review of the OpenSSL documentation 
revealed that the installation, like zlib, should not be difficult.  The latest source,openssl-
0.9.7d, was downloaded and installed.   
3. Entropy Gathering Daemon   
The entropy gathering daemon is needed to provide a software-based pseudo-
random number generator.  It was quickly discovered that without some type of random 
number generator, OpenSSH will not run; the application will exit with the error, “prng 
not seeded.”  A quick alternative was needed.  As mentioned, both the OpenSSH and 
OpenSSL documentation mentioned two software-based random number generators: the 
pseudo-random number generator daemon (PRNGd) and the entropy gathering daemon 
(EGD).  Both daemons stated compatibility with OpenSSL and OpenSSH.  The PRNGd 
documentation also mentioned that the PRNGd also provided an interface to the EGD.  
This implies that the EGD provides greater compatibility with more systems.  A test of 
each random number generator was not conducted and is beyond the scope of this report.  
The EGD is a perl script that monitors processes and provides random data based on 
information gathered from the processes.  This data is then stirred each time a request for 
random data is made.  It should be mentioned that the mandatory security policies 
prevent the EGD from viewing all possible processes resulting in a smaller pool of 
processes from which to gather random data.  The EGD can only view processes running 
at the same secrecy and integrity levels as itself.  For each OpenSSH daemon running, 
there must be an EGD running at the same level.  This is very important because if the 
random number generator is exhausted, then OpenSSH will stop functioning either by 
waiting for random data to become available or by the daemon refusing to start.  Both 
would result in an inability to function.  It is suggested that an alternative to the EGD be 
found or developed. 
4. MYSEA Libraries 
As shown in  Table 2, some of the system calls require privileges.  The MYSEA 
libraries provide APIs for acquiring and revoking privileges.  The MYSEA libraries must 
be installed so that OpenSSH can operate properly. 
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III. INTEGRATION OF OPENSSH ONTO THE XTS-400 
This chapter will provide the goals of this project, the methodology used to 
accomplish those goals, the results of the research, and solutions to the problems 
encountered.  
A. GOALS 
The goals of this project are to port OpenSSH to the XTS-400 with as much of the 
functionality preserved as possible.  The key functions desired are the interactive session 
and the use of PKI for authentication.    An extra benefit of this work is the provision of a 
better understanding of the functions supported by the XTS-400.   This may inform future 
porting projects on the XTS-400.   
B. METHODOLOGY 
To port a particular application to the XTS-400, a number of steps must be 
completed.  One step is to look at the documentation of the application that will be 
ported.  Here, it is important to identify any references to other software packages that the 
application requires.  If these additional software packages are not available on the XTS-
400, then they must be ported first.  Another item to look for in the documentation is the 
process architecture of the application.  When the process architecture is not available, a 
thorough examination of the source code will help to determine the process architecture.  
The process architecture is important because the XTS-400 enforces mandatory security 
policies and will not allow processes at different sensitivity levelsto communicate with 
one another unless privileges are given to both processes.  Another step is to review the 
documentation for the XTS-400 and look for any system calls not supported by the 
operating system that are required by the application.  Each of these items: software 
dependencies, the process architecture and system compatibility, can either produce a 
delay in the port or a complete roadblock.   
For this research the above steps were followed but the process was not 
sequential, but cyclic.  First, the OpenSSH documentation was reviewed, then the source 
code, then the XTS-400 documentation.  When a challenge, usually in the form of an 
unsupported system call, was discovered, all three sources of information were consulted.     
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A helpful tool used to review the source code deserves mention: the Linux Cross 
Reference (LXR).  This tool allows for the browsing of source code through a web-
browser.  Like a compiler, the LXR will generate a table of symbols and those symbols 
will be treated as links in the source code.  This feature allows for the quick lookup of 
variable and function declarations, definitions and references.  The source code for this 
tool can be downloaded from http://sourceforge.net/projects/lxr.   
The documentation for the XTS-400 was a little vague or incomplete at times.  In 
order to verify that a normal feature on Linux or UNIX was not supported on the XTS-
400, the XTS-40 manuals were consulted and then test programs were used.  Theses test 
programs were written for a Fedora Core 1 Linux platform and then tested on that 
platform.  The test programs were then transferred to the XTS-400 for testing and the 
results from each platform were compared.  This was done to verify that support for the 
given feature was not implemented if proper documentation could not be found so that a 
blind assumption would not be made.   
C. PORTING RESULTS 
OpenSSH was successfully ported to the XTS-400, with some limited 
functionality.  Privilege separation could not be implemented because file-descriptor 
passing is not supported by the XTS-400.  To simplify the port, the only authentication 
method available is public-key authentication.  Each single level LAN requires an 
OpenSSH daemon and there is no communication between any of the daemons as a 
consequence of the mandatory access control policies. 
D. CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED 
 The challenges encountered are the features listed in Tables 1 and 2.  A 
discussion of the solutions used to circumvent these limitations is presented in the order 
they are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  All source code modifications can be found in 
Appendix B: Source Code Listing.  All modified files are in the “openssh-3.7.1p2” source 
code directory. 
1. System Features 
The two system features listed in  Table 1 are the root user and file descriptor 
passing.  As mentioned in  Table 2, the root user does not exist.  The XTS-400 does not 
give a single user all system privileges; rather the integrity policy is used to mediate 
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access to privileged operations.  In an OpenBSD system, the OpenSSH daemon runs as 
the root user.  The OpenSSH code performs user ID checks to verify that the daemon is 
running as the root user.  If these checks fail, then the daemon assumes that it is not 
running with root user privileges and will not function properly.  In the XTS-400, the 
OpenSSH daemon must run as the network user so that port 22 can be opened.  Port 22 is 
the default port for the SSH protocol.  To account for the non-existence of the root user, 
the user ID checks were altered to check for the user ID of the network user.  The 
modifications were made to the temporarily_use_uid and the permanently_set_uid 
functions in the “uidswap.c” file and the do_setusercontext function in the “session.c” 
file. 
File descriptor passing is required for SSH privilege separation.  The system 
feature of file descriptor passing through UNIX domain sockets is not supported by the 
XTS-400 [DIG03a].  The only solution would be to build support for this feature into the 
operating system.  The operating system for the XTS-400 is called the Secure Trusted 
Operating Program (STOP).  STOP is proprietary and cannot be modified without 
invalidating the evaluated assurance level assigned by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology and the National Security Agency.  Because there is no feasible solution 
for this problem, privilege separation has been disabled.  
These problems were the only ones encountered for this category of challenges.  
The next category to be discussed is the system functions provided by the XTS-400. 
2. System Functions 
There are many system functions that are used by OpenSSH.  The untrusted 
environment of the XTS-400 strongly resembles Redhat Linux 8.0.  This strong 
resemblanceis only superficial.  In fact, many of these functions were not implemented 
on the XTS-400 and were only APIs with functional stubs. 
The chroot system call was identified by the configuration file as being available 
on the XTS-400; however, it would exit with the error “Function not implemented.”  In 
the XTS-400 documentation, chroot is listed as an unsupported system call [DIG03c].  
Support for this system call must be built into the operating system, but this is not an 
option.  The solution used involved commenting out all references to the chroot system 
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call in the source code.  The modifications occurred in the privsep_preauth_child 
function in the “sshd.c” file.  Privilege separation is not implemented and this function 
should never be called, but it has remained commented out to ensure that the daemon 
does not exit prematurely. 
The setgroups function is also not implemented on the XTS-400 as mentioned in 
the User’s Manual for the XTS-400 [DIG03c].  All references to this system call were 
commented out.  The modifications are in the main and privsep_preauth_child functions 
of the “sshd.c” file and the temporarily_use_uid and restore_uid functions in the 
“uidswap.c” file.  
The initgroups system call is not supported either.  All references to this system 
call have been commented out.  The modifications are in the temporarily_use_uid 
function in the “uidswap.c” file and the do_setusercontext function in the “session.c” file. 
The socketpair system call is not implemented.  This call returns with the error 
“invalid argument”.  The XTS-400 documentation states that unsupported interprocess 
communication (IPC) mechanisms will return the error “Invalid Argument” [DIG03c].  
OpenSSH provides compatibility for the use of UNIX domain socket pairs or pairs of 
pipes for IPC.  A modification had to be made to force OpenSSH to use pairs of pipes 
instead of socket pairs.  The modification was to uncomment the line, #define 
USE_PIPES 1, in the “defines.h” file.  Socketpair is used extensively in the monitor code 
that is used when privilege separation is enabled.  In an attempt to support privilege 
separation, pairs of pipes were created to replace the socket pair.  Privilege separation 
appeared to work through the pre-authentication phase of a user login, but because file 
descriptor passing is not supported, no tests could be conducted to verify that this phase 
of privilege separation did work as intended.  All modifications made to the monitor-
specific files have been commented out.  The files that were modified are “monitor.c”, 
“monitor_wrap.c” and “monitor.h”.   
There are many functions that can be used to set the real and effective user and 
group IDs of a process.  These functions are listed in  Table 1 and  Table 2.  These system 
calls are supported by the XTS-400, but require special XTS-400 privileges to operate 
properly.  The specific privilege that they require is set_owner_group on the XTS-400 
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[DIG03b].  Privileges can be granted to programs by installing the program with tp_edit.  
To follow the principle of least privilege, the privileges should be granted when 
necessary and then be revoked when not needed.  The MYSEA libraries provide APIs to 
request and revoke the set_owner_group privilege.  The modifications made to the source 
code were to the temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid and permanently_set_uid functions in 
the “uidswap.c” file.  The header files for the MYSEA libraries had to be included in the 
“uidswap.c” file in order for the C compiler to locate and link the appropriate functions 
when the executable is being constructed.  The OpenSSH configuration script had to be 
given extra arguments to specify the location of the libraries and which libraries to use.  
The options given to the configuration script can be seen in Appendix A. 
The daemon system call is not supported in the XTS-400 untrusted environment.  
The OpenSSH source code provides a directory called “openbsd-compat” under the 
“openssh-3.7.1p2” source directory that provides certain functions that may not be 
implemented on the target platform.  Daemon is one of the functions provided in the 
“openbsd-compat” directory.  However, the OpenSSH configuration file identified the 
daemon API as being supported by the XTS-400, but this is incorrect because the daemon 
API is only a functional stub.  The linking order when the executable is being built will 
not permit the daemon function in “openbsd-compat” to be used instead of the daemon 
system call provided by the XTS-400.  The solution for this was to copy the daemon code 
from the “openbsd-compat/daemon.c” file into the “sshd.c” file.  A new function 
prototype was added to the “sshd.c” file and the function definition was added to the end 
of the “sshd.c” file.  The new daemon function is called daemonize to prevent the linker 
from calling the daemon system call provided by the XTS-400. 
These are the solutions for the system calls that were either not supported or that 
required privileges.  The next set of challenges involved system files that OpenSSH 
expects to be present on the system.   
3. System Files 
There are four system files that OpenSSH assumes to be present on the system: 
“/etc/passwd”, “/etc/shadow”, “/var/run/utmp”, “/var/log/wtmp” and “etc/group”.  The 
passwd file is present on the XTS-400 system while the remaining three files are not. 
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The “/etc/passwd” file is used by the untrusted environment to assign each user a 
user ID, a home directory and a default shell.  The “/etc/passwd” file is generated by the 
xtsmkpasswd command.  This command does not produce a correct “passwd” file 
because the default group listed in the file assigns all users to the system group.  The 
system group is reserved for the STOP kernel and no user should ever have this group 
assigned as their default group.  OpenSSH uses the “/etc/passwd” file to associate the 
supplied username with the appropriate user ID and the default group ID of the user when 
the user attempts to login.  The user’s default group is assigned by the system 
administrator when the user’s account is created.  The “/etc/passwd” file had to be 
modified to reflect the proper default group association for the users of the system.  The 
modifications made were to the fourth field of every line in the “/etc/passwd” file.  In 
order to make the mdofications, the trusted command, ua_edit, was used to lookup the 
default group for every user in XTS-400. 
The “/etc/shadow” file is not present on the XTS-400.  The functionality 
supported by the “/etc/shadow” file is replaced by two trusted databases on the XTS-400: 
the “user access authorization” database and the “user access information” database.  The 
“user access authorization” database contains the following information: a password 
history list, a change password flag, a default group identifier, maximum mandatory 
session levels, default mandatory session levels, last login time, number of failed login 
attempts, time of last password change, and a list of user capabilities.  The “user access 
information” database contains: the username, the user’s home directory and a default 
shell.  This last database is similar to the “/etc/passwd” file mentioned earlier.  The “user 
access authorization” database is stored at the highest secrecy and integrity levels and is 
protected by the subtype DAC mechanism.  Without the “/etc/shadow” file, password 
authentication will not succeed.  For password authentication to work, the OpenSSH 
daemon would have to be granted access to the user databases and, in order to accomplish 
this, more privileges would have to be granted to the OpenSSH daemon.  The specific 
privileges are simple_security_exempt and subtype_exempt.  It was determined that 
further and more detailed analysis would be needed to determine where to insert the 
privileged code.  There was no solution for fixing the absence of the “/etc/shadow” file.  
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The workaround was to disable password authentication so that the OpenSSH daemon 
would not attempt to access a nonexistent file. 
The next two files are related and are discussed together.  The  “/var/log/wtmp” 
file contains a record of all user logins and logouts.  This file is not present on the XTS-
400 as its functionality is provided by the trusted “user access authorization” database 
discussed earlier.  The “/var/run/utmp” file contains a record of all users currently logged 
in to the system.  This file is not present either.  These files are used for account login 
auditing in a Linux system.  Because these files are not present and the functionality of 
only one is provided through a trusted database that would require privileges to access it, 
the solution was to disable support for these files.  This was accomplished by giving the 
OpenSSH configuration script a few extra options that disabled support for these files.  
The options given to the configuration script can be seen in Appendix A. 
The last system file presented is the “/etc/group” file.  This file stores information 
on all groups including a list of users associated with each group.  This file would 
normally be used by the setgroups and initgroups system calls, but as mentioned, these 
calls are not supported.  The “/etc/groups” file is generated by the xtsmkgroup command.  
This command does not produce a correct “/etc/group” file.  After examining the file, no 
users were listed with their associated groups.  In the event that setgroups and initgroups 
are implemented, this file will have to be modified manually to contain the correct 
information that these system calls will require.  The functionality of the “/etc/group” file 
is provided by the two trusted group databases: the “group access authorization” database 
and the “group access information” database.  These two databases are stored at the 
highest secrecy level and protected by the subtype DAC mechanism.  To support the 
proper association of users to groups, access to these databases would have to be granted 
through privileges.  The analysis required to identify where the privileged code should be 
added was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
These were the only problems encountered regarding protected system files on the 




4. Environment   
In an OpenBSD system, daemons are started by the init process and this process 
creates all other processes in the system [STE93].  When a daemon is started either by the 
init process or through a shell, an environment is created that includes the allocation of 
three file streams: STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR.  These three streams are associated 
with the following file descriptors: 0, 1 and 2 respectively.  OpenSSH expects these three 
streams and corresponding file descriptors.  On the XTS-400, daemon processes are 
started from the start_daemon command.  This command does not allocate the three file 
streams expected by OpenSSH so when OpenSSH starts to allocate files, the file 
descriptor numbering starts at 0.  When a user logs in through the OpenSSH daemon, a 
pseudo-terminal is requested and it is referenced by a file descriptor.  If the file descriptor 
used to reference the pseudo-terminal is one of the three reserved file descriptors that 
OpenSSH assumes to be provided, then all I/O will be sent to the pseudo-terminal across 
the network connection.  During the authentication session setup sequence of a user 
login, specifically structured messages are sent between the client and the server.  If all of 
the pseudo-terminal I/O is sent to the client, then the client gets confused and exits.  In 
the main function of the “sshd.c” file, the developers of OpenSSH placed comments 
stating that the file descriptors 0, 1 and 2 should be reserved and never closed.  To solve 
this problem, the “/dev/null” file was opened three times so that the first three entries in 
the file descriptor table would be in use.  This will cause the file descriptor numbering to 
begin after 2.  The modifications made were in the main function of the “sshd.c” file. 
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IV. INTEGRATION TESTING 
After porting an application to a different platform, testing is required to ensure 
that the application still functions as specified.  The functionality of the ported 
application may have been altered by the modifications to the source code.  In order to 
detect any difference in functionality, comprehensive testing is required.  Developmental 
testing tests the functionality of the ported application in a simple environment.  To 
ensure that the ported application can function in a more realistic environment, a larger 
and more realistic testing environment is needed.  The testing in this environment is 
called Testbed testing.   
Due to time constraints, only the developmental testing was performed for the 
OpenSSH port to the XTS-400.  Both testing methods will be discussed in this chapter; 
however only the results for the developmental testing will be provided. 
A. DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING 
1. Test Plan 
The developmental test plan describes the results used to validate that the port of 
OpenSSH to the XTS-400 is successful.  A small network was created with three laptops, 
one is a Fedora Core 1 Linux system and the other two are Windows XP systems.  The 
three clients are connected to the XTS-400 machine, “Holmes,” though a switch.  Holmes 
has a network interface card that has four interfaces.  One interface is used to simulate the 
MLS-LAN with one client and one TPE.  The other three interfaces are used to simulate 
the multiple single level LANs.  The IP addresses of the three single level clients were to 
be configured to allow those clients to communicate with the corresponding network as 

















Figure 1.   Developmental Testing Network Topology 
 
a. MAC Policy Enforcement 
The purpose of this test suite is to verify that the mandatory policies 
enforced by the XTS-400 are still enforced when a user is logged in through OpenSSH.  
The test plan is presented in  Table 3.  The Test Type identifies the kind of test being 
performed.  The Session Level identifies the secrecy and integrity levels of the remote 
user.  The Object Level identifies the secrecy and integrity levels of the object.  The 
command used to test for read-access is more.  This command only requires and uses 
read access; modification of the file is not required.  The command used for writing is vi 
– the visual editor.  Vi is a common editor that is available on most systems.  Vi needs to 
be able to both modify and save the modifications.  The integrity levels of OSS and 
Admin are defined as il3{all integrity compartments} and il7{all integrity compartments} 
respectively.  In this suite of tests, a result of “pass” means that the operation was 
allowed, e.g., more was able to display the file, and vi was able to edit the file and save 
the changes.  A result of “fail” means that the operation was not permitted.  Vi can appear 
to make modifications, but if the modifications cannot be saved, then the write-access test 
fails.   
The objects are text files with the following naming convention: 
test_sl#il#.txt where the two pound signs are replaced with the appropriate object level 
numbers, e.g., test_sl1il3.txt if the object level is sl1:il3.  The permissions on the objects 
are read, write, and execute for owner, group and world.  This ensures that the 
24 
25 
discretionary policies do not interfere with the tests.  Because the XTS-400 does not 
allow subjects to write to objects if the level of the parent directory is dominated by the 
level of the subject or object, directories had to be created to hold the objects at the 
specific sensitivity levels in order to allow tests for writing.  For example, for objects 
with a level of sl1:il3, a directory with the same level had to be created to hold the 
objects.    






a1 sl2:il3 more Fail 
a2 sl3:il3 more Fail 
a3 
sl1:il3 
sl4:il3 more Fail 
a4 sl3:il3 more Fail 
a5 
sl2:il3 
sl4:il3 more Fail 
a6 
Secrecy read -up 
sl3:il3 sl4:il3 more Fail 
a7 sl1:il3 sl0:il3 more Pass 
a8 sl0:il3 more Pass 
a9 
sl2:il3 
sl1:il3 more Pass 
a10 sl0:il3 more Pass 




sl2:il3 more Pass 
a13 sl1:il3 sl1:il3 more Pass 
a14 sl2:il3 sl2:il3 more Pass 
a15 
Secrecy  read-equal 
sl3:il3 sl3:il3 more Pass 
a16 sl2:il3 vi Fail 
a17 sl3:il3 vi Fail 
a18 
sl1:il3 
sl4:il3 vi Fail 
a19 sl3:il3 vi Fail 
a20 
sl2:il3 
sl4:il3 vi Fail 
a21 
Secrecy  write-up 
sl3:il3 sl4:il3 vi Fail 
a22 sl1:il3 sl0:il3 vi Fail 
a23 sl0:il3 vi Fail 
a24 
sl2:il3 
sl1:il3 vi Fail 
a25 sl0:il3 vi Fail 
a26 sl1:il3 vi Fail 
a27 
Secrecy  write-down 
sl3:il3 
sl2:il3 vi Fail 
a28 sl1:il3 sl1:il3 vi Pass 
a29 sl2:il3 sl2:il3 vi Pass 
a30 
Secrecy write-equal 
sl3:il3 sl3:il3 vi Pass 
a31 Integrity read-up sl1:il3 sl1:OSS more Pass 
a32 sl1:il0 more Fail 
a33 sl1:il1 more Fail 
a34 
Integrity read-down sl1:il3 
sl1:il2 more Fail 
a35 Integrity write-up sl1:il3 sl1:OSS vi Fail 
a36 sl1:il0 vi Fail 
a37 sl1:il1 vi Fail 
a38 
Integrity write-down sl1:il3 
sl1:il2 vi Fail 
Table 3. MAC Policy Enforcement Test 
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As mentioned, this suite of tests verifies that the MAC policies are 
enforced.  Each MAC policy has two properties that must be maintained: a simple 
security or integrity property and a *-property.   Table 4 presents definitions of the types 
of test used in this suite of tests.  In this table, the Policy Type identifies whether the 
definition is for the mandatory secrecy or integrity policy.  The Property column 
identifies which property of the mandatory policies is being tested.  The Access Type 
specifies the type of access.  The Definition gives the mathematical definition of the 
property where S represents the subject, O represents the object, sl() means the secrecy 
level, il() means the integrity level, ‘=’ means equality, ‘>’ means dominates, and ‘<’ 
means is dominated by.  The last column in the table states whether or not the action is 
allowed given the Property of the Policy type.  The models that represent the security 
policies allow for secrecy write-up and integrity write-down.  However, the XTS-400 
does not allow these access types so the expected results for the XTS-400 should be no.  
The effected entries in the table are identified by an asterisk.   
Policy Type Property Access Type Definition Allowed 
Read-equal sl(S) = sl(O) Yes 
Read-down sl(S) > sl(O) Yes 
simple security 
Read-up sl(S) < sl(O) No 
Write-equal sl(S) = sl(O) Yes 
Write-down sl(S) > sl(O) No 
Secrecy 
*-property 
Write-up sl(S) < sl(O) Yes* 
Read-equal il(S) = il(O) Yes 
Read-down il(S) > il(O) No 
simple integrity 
Read-up il(S) < il(O) Yes 
Write-equal il(S) = il(O) Yes 
Write-down il(S) > il(O) Yes* 
Integrity 
*-property 
Write-up il(S) < il(O) No 
Table 4. MAC Policy Test Definitions 
In the mandatory secrecy policy, the simple security property does not 
allow a subject to access an object if the secrecy level of the subject does not dominate 
the secrecy level of the object.  Therefore, all secrecy read-up tests should fail.  All 
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secrecy read-down and read-equal tests should pass.  The *-property of the secrecy policy 
does not allow a subject to modify an object if the secrecy level of the subject dominates 
the secrecy level of the object.  All secrecy write-down tests should fail.  Theoretically, it 
is possible for a subject to modify an object if the secrecy level of the subject is 
dominated by the secrecy level of the object; however, the XTS-400 does not allow this 
action, so all secrecy write-up tests should fail as well.  Only the secrecy write-equal tests 
should pass.   
The simple integrity property of the mandatory integrity policy does not 
allow a subject to read an object if the integrity level of the subject dominates the 
integrity level of the object.  All integrity read-down tests should fail and all integrity 
read-up and read-equal tests should pass.  The *-property of the mandatory integrity 
policy does not allow a subject to modify an object if the integrity level of the subject is 
dominated by the integrity level of the object.  All integrity write-up tests should fail.  
The formal model for the mandatory integrity policy allows for the theoretical write-
down from a subject to an object, but this is not allowed on the XTS-400 and all integrity 
write-down tests should fail.  Only the integrity write-equal tests should pass.   
b. DAC Policy Enforcement 
The purpose of this test suite is to verify that the discretionary access 
control policies enforced by the XTS-400 are still enforced when logged in through 
OpenSSH.  The test plan is presented in  Table 5.  The username and group name used to 
run this test should remain constant, i.e., the same user login, “cherbig” with a default 
group of “other”, is used to test all cases.  The object permissions identify the 
permissions of the object that can be seen when the ls –l command is issued.  The object 
name identifies how the object was named to help keep track of the permissions.  The 
naming convention is discussed later.  The object owner identifies the username of the 
owner of the object and the object group identifies the group name of the owning group.  
The action identifies the type of access tested.  For read-access, the command, more, will 
be used to attempt to read the file.  The vi tool will be used to test for write-access.  To 
test for execute-access, the file name will be entered at the shell prompt, i.e., the file will 
have to be a program.   
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The objects for read- and write-access tests are text files.  The objects used 
for execute-access are simple c-programs that print a message to the screen.  The naming 
convention for the text files are “test_<o or g or a><r or w or x>.txt”, where o means 
owner, g means group and a means all and r means read, w means write and x means 
execute.  The “or” specified in the filename is not exclusive.  For example, the file 
“test_orwx.txt” means that the object permissions are read, write and execute for the 
owner.  The programs used for testing execute-access will have the same file name 
without the “.txt” extension.  The session and object levels will remain fixed in order to 






























b1 read Allowed 






b4 read Allowed 






b7 read Allowed 






b10 read Allowed 






b13 read Allowed 






b16 read Fail 






b19 read Allowed 






b22 read Allowed 






b25 read Allowed 






b28 read Allowed 






b31 read Fail 






b34 read Fail 






Table 5. DAC Policy Enforcement Test 
 
c. TPE Testing with Files Created by OpenSSH 
The purpose of these tests is to verify that when users login from the 
MLS-LAN through the TPEs, they can view the files created under OpenSSH.  The test 
30 
plan is presented in  Table 6.  The TPE Login Level specifies the session level of the 
current test.  The TPE allows users to negotiate and renegotiate their session level.  This 
test will also test for MAC policy enforcement through the TPE.  The Object Levels are 
the secrecy and integrity levels of the object.  A result of “yes” means that the file was 
viewable through the web-browser and a result of “no” means that the file could not be 
displayed.   
This test suite uses the MYSEA web-server’s ability to navigate and 
display pages from the user’s home directory.  In order to do this, a special directory, 
“public_html”, had to be created under the user’s home directory.  This directory  must 
have the same levels as the user’s home directory and the permissions must be read, write 
and execute for the owner, and read and execute for the group and world.  Within the 
“public_html” directory, there must be three more directories, one for each network 
classification.  The levels of these three directories must be set appropriately using fsm.  
This will allow OpenSSH to create and modify files as long as the files are within these 
directories.  A diagram of the proposed file system structure is presented in  Figure 2.   In 
the diagram, the levels of the required directories are also listed. 
The objects used in this test are text files which can be viewed through a 
web-browser. 
TPE Viewable Test Number TPE Login Level Object Levels 
Expected Results 
c1 sl1:il3 Yes 




c4 sl1:il3 Yes 




c7 sl1:il3 Yes 




Table 6. TPE Viewing Capability Test for OpenSSH Created Files 
/bin etc dev home usr xts















Figure 2.   File System Stru r TPE Test
d. TPE Testing with File
h -existing 
files through OpenSSH are viewable from the MLS-LAN through the TPEs.  This test 
plan is ry sim ble 7 
cture fo ing 
 
s Modified by OpenSSH 
T e purpose of this test suite is to verify that changes made to pre
ve ilar to the previous test.  The test plan is presented in  Ta
Test objects were created at the console of the XTS-400 prior to the 
execution of the tests.  The objects are within the three network-classified directories 
under the “public_html” subdirectory.  This allows for a user logged in through OpenSSH 
to modify the files.   




d1 sl1:il3 s Ye














d7 sl1:il3 Yes 
d8 sl2:il3 Yes 
d9 sl3:il3 Yes 
sl3:il3 
Table 7. TPE Viewing Capability Test for Files Modified by OpenSSH 
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eous User Logins 
urp st su y tha  the same 
single level LAN can login.  Success is determined by the user being presented with a 
shell  the command i, returns s correct username.  The test plan is 
presented in  Table 8.   
s 
 
e. Single Level LAN – Simultan
The p ose of this te ite is to verif t multiple users on
and , whoam  the user’
Successful LoginT r
Expected Results 








Table 8. Single Level LAN – Simultaneous User Logins 
 
f. Multiple Single Level LANs – Simultaneous User Logins 
The purpose of this test suite is to verify that users can login from multiple 
networks of varying classifications.  The test plan is presented in  Table 9.  Each user, 
specified by the username logs in at each network.  Success is determined by the user 
being presented with a shell and the command, whoami, returns the correct username and 
the l r rre e
Successful Login 
evel command eturns the co ct session lev l. 
Test Number N Leve sernam
Expected Result 
LA l U e 
sl1:il3 herbig Yes c
sl2:il3 mo Yes de
f1 
sl3:il3 testuser Yes 




g. Public Key Authentication
The purpose of these tests is to verify that the public key authentication 
mechanism works properly.  The test plan is presented in  Table 10.  In this test suite, a 
valid username means that the user does exist within the system.  An invalid user means 
that a username was supplied, but that user does not exist on the system.  A correct 
private key means that the private key has a corresponding public key belonging to the 
user attempting to login.  A wrong private key means that the private key used does not 
match the public key presented by the user.   
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Test Number User Name Private assphrase Expected Results Key P
g1 V rrect Salid Co Correct ucceed 
g2 Valid rrect Wrong Fail Co
g3 Valid Wrong Correct Fail 




er’s home directory is not present, 
i.e., it was nev reat  either the user 
or the Adminis
at of his home directory.   
Test Number Case Environment Expected Results 
able 10. Public K  Authentication Test 
h. Miscellaneous Te
To test how OpenSSH reacts when the user’s account is created 
incorrectly, a set of experiments was created.  The test plan is presented in  Table 11.  The 
first case tests to see how OpenSSH reacts when a us
er c ed.  The second test, determines what happens when
trator revoke all permissions on the user’s home directory.  The third test 
determines what happens when a user logs in from a network with a lower security 
classification than th
h1 Home directory not 
present 
Home directory not 
present 
Cannot login, no key 
file 
h2 permissions on 
home directory 
incorrect 
---------  $HOME Cannot login, cannot 
read key file 















Table 11. ellane sts  
2. Test Valida Re
This section provides the results of the above tests as conducted on the 
developmental system for the port.  The tables from the test plan have been replicated and 
a column with the test re  b ed to e
MAC Policy ement Test Validation Results 
For this s tes est res atched the expected results and it 
can be concluded that the MAC policies rema orced  users a ged in 
th  Ope
 Misc ous Te
tion port 
sults has een add ach. 
a.  Enforc
uite of ts, the t ults m





















a1 sl2:il3 more Fail Fail 
a2 sl3:il3 more Fail Fail 
a3 
sl1:il3 
sl4:il3 more Fail Fail 
a4 sl3:il3 more Fail Fail 
a5 
sl2:il3 




re sl3:il3 sl4:il3 mo Fail Fail 
a7 sl1:il3 sl0:il3 more Pass Pass 
a8 sl0:il3 more Pass Pass 
a9 
sl2:il3 
sl1:il3 more Pass Pass 
a10 sl0:il3 more Pass Pass 






sl2:il3 more Pass Pass 
a13 sl1:il3 sl1:il3 more Pass Pass 







equal sl3:il3 sl3:il3 mo Pass Pass 
a16 sl2:il3 vi Fail Fail 
a17 sl3:il3 vi Fail Fail 
a18 
sl1:il3 
sl4:il3 vi Fail Fail 
a19 sl3:il3 vi Fail Fail 
a20 Fail 
sl2:il3 




sl3:il3 sl4:il3 vi Fail 
a22 Fail sl1:il3 sl0:il3 vi Fail 
a23 sl0:il3 vi Fail Fail 
a24 
sl2:il3 
sl1:il3 vi Fail Fail 
a25 sl0:il3 vi Fail Fail 








sl2:il3 vi Fail 
a28 sl1:il3 sl1:il3 Pass vi Fail 




eq sl3:il3 vi P0 
crecy 
ite-





sl1:il3 sl1:OSS m  Pass Pass 
a3 sl1:il0 more Fail 2  Fail 








wn sl1:il2 more ail Fail 
a3 In
write-up 
3 sl1:OSS vi F5 tegrity sl1:il ail Fail 
a3 Fail 6 sl1:il0 vi Fail 









Tab C Policy m es atiole 12. MA  Enforce ent T t Valid n Results 
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b. DAC Policy Enforcement Test Validation Results 
ests d t  t S-4 C po e still 

















b1 read Allowed Allowed






b4 read Allowed Allowed






b7 read Allowed Allowed






b10 read Allowed edAllow





execute Fail Fail 
b13 read Allowed edAllow





execute Fail Fail 
b16 read Fail Fail 




-------- cherbig other 
execute Fail Fail 
b19 read Allowed Allowed




rwxrw demo other 
xecute Allowed Allowed
xrwx 
b22 read Allowed Allowed
b23 we wedwrite Allo d Allo
b24 




execute Allow d Allo
b25 d Allowed llowedrea A





ecute Fail Fail 
demo 
ex
b28 d Allowed llowedrea A





ecute Fail Fail 
xr----- demo 
ex
b31 d Fail ail rea F





ecute Fail Fail 
x------ demo 
ex
b34 read Fail Fail  
b35 write Fail Fail 
b36 
atest_grwx.txt 
---rwx--- demo stop 
execute Fail Fail 




 of tests validated the claim that files created through OpenSSH 
can be viewed fr  the TP
c. TPE Testing with File Created by OpenSSH Test Validation 
Results 
This suite
om the MLS LAN through Es.   
TPE Viewable Test 
Number 
Login Levels 







c1 sl1:il3 Yes Yes 
c2 sl2:il3 No No 
c3 
sl1:il3 
 sl3:il3 No No 
c4 sl1:il3 Yes Yes 
c5 sl2:il3 Yes Yes 
c6 
sl2:il3 
 sl3:il3 No No 
c7 sl1:il3 Yes Yes 
c8 sl2:il3 Yes Yes 
c9 sl3:il3 Yes Yes 
sl3:il3 
Table 14. TPE Viewing Capability for OpenSSH Created Files Test Validation Results 
 
d. ting with Files Modified by OpenSSH Test Validation 
alidated that files created at the console of the XTS-
400 and modified by a user logged in through OpenSSH can be viewed from the MLS 















d1 sl1:il3 Yes Yes 
d2 sl2:il3 No No 
d3
sl1:il3 
sl3:il3 No  No 
d4  s  sl1:il3 Yes Ye






d7 sl1:il3 Yes Yes 
d8 sl2:il3 Yes Yes 
d9 
sl3:il3 
sl3:il3 Yes Yes 
Table 15. TPE Viewing nSSH Modified Files Test Validation Results 
 
This test demonstrated that a sin  could handle 
multiple simultaneou ins. 
 
 Capability with Ope
e. Single Level LAN – Simultaneous User Logins Test Validation 
Results 







LA  Results N Level User Name Actual
Expected Results 
cherbig Pass Pass 





r astestuse Pass P s 
Table 16 AN – ultaneous User Login alid ults 
 
f. tiple Single Level LANs – Simultaneous User Logins Test 
dation  
om multiple 
single level LANs simultaneously. 
in 
. Single Level L  Sim s Test V ation Res
Mul
Vali  Results




 Expected Result Results 
N Level Username 
sl1:il3 cherbig Yes Yes 
sl2:il3 demo Yes Yes 
f1 
sl3:il3 testuser Yes Yes 
Table 17. le Single Level LANs – Simultaneous User Logins Test Validation Results 
g. Public Key Authentication Test Validation Results 



















g1 rre uccValid Co ct Correct Succeed S eed 
g2 Valid Correct rong Fail Fail W
g3 n Fail ail Valid Wro g Correct F
g4 Invalid orrect Correct Fail Fail C
Ta  Key Au alidatio s 
 
h. Miscellaneous Test Validation Results 
T t ct as expected when 
user accounts are not configured properly. 
ble 18. Public thentication Test V n Result










h1 Home directory not 
present 






h2 permissions on home 
directory incorrect 




h3 level on home 
directory incorrect 
level($HOME) = 






Table 19. Miscellaneous Test Validation Results 
 
B. MLS TEST BED TESTING 
1. Test Plan 
The purpose of testing the OpenSSH port in the MLS testbed is to verify 
OpenSSH functionality in a more realistic environment.  The only tests that need to be 
performed are the OpenSSH login and TPE tests because the XTS-400 in the testbed 
should also enforce the same policies as the XTS-400 used in the developmental testing 
so it is redundant to repeat the MAC and DAC tests.  The network topology for the MLS 
testbed is taken from [IRV04] and is presented in  Figure 3.  The clients used to connect to 
the XTS-400 are the web servers for each single level LAN.  The XTS-400 is the 




Figure 3.   MLS Testbed Network Topology taken from [IRV04] 
a. TPE Testing with Files Created by OpenSSH 
The same test performed for the developmental testing is repeated for in 
the testbed environment.  See the developmental test plan for more details on these tests.  
The test plan is presented in  Table 20. 
TPE Viewable Test Number TPE Login Level Object Levels 
Expected Results 
Ba1 sl1:il3 Yes 




Ba4 sl1:il3 Yes 




Ba7 sl1:il3 Yes 




Table 20. MLS Testbed – TPE Testing with Files Created Through OpenSSH 
 
b. TPE Testing with Files Modified by OpenSSH 
The same test performed for the developmental testing is repeated in the 
testbed environment.  See the developmental test plan for more details on these tests.  
The test plan is presented in  Table 21. 




Bb1 sl1:il3 s Ye






Bb4 sl1:il3 Yes 




Bb7 sl1:il3 Yes 




Table 21. MLS Testbed – TPE Testing with Files Modified Through OpenSSH 
c. Single Level LAN – Simultaneous Us
The sam rformed for the developmental testing is repeated in the 





ental test plan for more details on these tests. 
The test pl n is presented in  Table 22. 
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Table 22. MLS Testbed – Single Level LAN – Simultaneous User Logins 
 
in s eou
The st perfo  the d ental testing is repeated in the 
testbed environmen  the dev tal tes r more ils on these tests.  
The lan
Successful Login 
d. Multiple S gle Level LAN  – Simultan s User Logins 
same te rmed for evelopm
t.  See elopmen t plan fo  deta
test p  is present  in  Table 23 . ed
Test Number LAN Level Username 
Expected Result 
sl1:il3 cherbig Yes 
sl2:il3 demo Yes 
Bd1 
sl3:il3 testuser Yes 
Table 23. MLS Testbed – Multiple Single Level LANs – Simultaneous User Logins 
 
e. Public Key Authentication Tests 
The same test performed for the developmental testing is repeated in the 
testbed environment.  See the developmental test plan for more details on these tests.  
The test plan is presented in  Table 24. 
Test Number User Name Private Key Passphrase Expected Results 
Be1 Valid Correct Correct Succeed 
Be2 Valid Correct Wrong Fail 
Be3 Valid Wrong Correct Fail 
Be4 Invalid Correct Correct Fail 




This study successfully ported OpenSSH, without privilege separation enabled, to 
the XTS-400.  Challenges caused by the functional differences between the XTS-400 and 
the Linux and OpenBSD platforms were encountered and solutions that did not require 
modification of the STOP source code were implemented.  Remote login capabilities are 
now supported on the XTS-400 through OpenSSH and can be provided to single level 
LAN users through the MYSEA project’s use of the XTS-400 as the MLS MYSEA 
server. 
Developmental tests were conducted and the results of those tests were provided.  
These tests ensure that the security policies cannot be violated by users when they are 
logged in through OpenSSHA plan for validation of the results on the MLS testbed was 
developed, but due to time constraints, was not executed.  The latter test plan is provided 
for future projects.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
Software porting with the XTS-400 as the target platform is difficult and time 
consuming; however, it can be achieved in most cases.  For this study, more time should 
have been allocated to discovering the differences between the XTS-400 and Linux 
systems.  This would have reduced the time spent tracking down errors.  A greater 
knowledge of the C programming language would have reduced the time spent analyzing 
the OpenSSH source code and provided a greater understanding of that code.  The 
porting process involved more time than anticipated   
C. FUTURE WORK 
The port of OpenSSH to the XTS-400 was successful, but the port resulted in a 
minor loss of functionality in OpenSSH.  This section suggests future projects that could 
restore the lost functionality to the OpenSSH port. 
One project is to implement password authentication with the XTS-400.  To do 
this, more privileges will have to be granted to the OpenSSH daemon.  The MYSEA 
libraries will help with this project, but the specific modifications to the OpenSSH source 
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code will have to be investigated to ensure that the privileges are acquired only when 
needed and then revoked when no longer in use.  Password authentication would be very 
convenient for users because they would not have to carry a key file and the XTS-400 
administrator would not have to worry about key generation and installation issues.   
Another project is to implement support for proper group association.  The 
setgroups and initgroups calls are not implemented and the “/etc/group” file is incorrect, 
so improper associations of users to groups could result in inadequate access permissions 
for users.  This project would involve assessing the trusted group databases and 
implementing the functionality that setgroups and initgroups would normally implement.  
An analysis of where to acquire and revoke the privileges required to access the trusted 
databases would be required.   
Another project would be to incorporate the remote shell capabilities of OpenSSH 
with the the MYSEA secure session server.  Currently, the MYSEA server does not 
implement a remote shell for the MLS LAN user.  The incorporation of the of the remote 
shell functionality would enable the MYSEA server to provide an interactive session to 
the user. 
The entropy gathering daemon is used to provide randomness which is required 
for cryptography.  Software-based pseudo-random number generators do not perform as 
well as hardware-based pseudo-random number generators.  A future project would be to 
design and implement a pseudo-random number generator that produces sufficient 
randomness in terms of both quality and quantity.   
A detailed vulnerability analysis should be performed for the ported OpenSSH.  
The XTS-400 documentation warns against network connectivity and explains the threats 
associated with networks [DIG03b].   
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APPENDIX A: SOFTWARE INSTALLATION 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the installation instructions for all of 
the software packages on the XTS-400 used in this project. The user should be familiar 
with the XTS-400 and the STOP operating system.  This appendix has two main sections: 
support software and OpenSSH.  The support software consists of the Entropy Gathering 
Daemon, the Zlib compression libraries and the OpenSSL encryption libraries.  The 
Secure Attention Key (SAK) on the XTS-400 console is the “alt” and “Print Screen” keys 
pressed simultaneously. 
A.  SUPPORT SOFTWARE 
For the Entropy Gathering Daemon, Zlib and OpenSSL installations, create a 
directory “src” in the “/usr” directory.  The “src” directory must have the following 
mandatory levels: min:oss.  Create another directory under “/usr” called “local”.  This 
directory should also be at min:oss.  The MYSEA libraries will be needed in order to 
install OpenSSH.  Installation of the MYSEA libraries should occur before any of these 
packages are installed. 
When using the cdtool, to copy files from the CD-ROM drive, the levels of the 
files may have to be downgraded or upgraded.  For now, assume that the level of the CD-
ROM is min:oss.  If it is not, then use sda to set the access level of the CD-ROM to the 
level of the current session. 
1.  Entropy Gathering Daemon 
Source code for the entropy gathering daemon can be obtained from 
http://egd.sourceforge.net/  The user installing the daemon should be logged in as admin 
at a level of min:oss.  It is suggested that the source be downloaded to the /usr/src 
directory.  Untar the file by issuing the command: tar  –xvf  egd.tar.  This will create a 
directory called “egd” and subdirectory under that directory called “egd-0.9”.  Navigate 
to the “egd-0.9” directory and issue the following commands: 
perl  Makefile.PL 
make 
make  test  
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make  install 
This will install the egd.pl perl script in the /usr/bin directory.  As user admin, 
enter the trusted environment by issuing the SAK.   
Use sl to change your session level to min security and max integrity 
(administrator, all compartments).   
Use fsm to copy the egd.pl script to the “/sys/daemon” directory. 
 Type fsm 
 Type copy for the request 
 Enter /usr/bin/egd.pl as the input path name 
 Enter /sys/daemon/egd.pl for the output path name 
 Type yes for create output file 
 A message is displayed that states that n bytes were copied. 
 While still in fsm, type change 
 Enter /sys/daemon/egd.pl for the pathname 
 Type no for modify access level 
 Enter network for the new owner 
 Enter network for the new group 
 Type yes for change discretionary access 
 Type rwx for owner 
 Hit enter for name of specific owner 
 Type rwx for group 
 Hit enter for specific group 
 Type rwx for others 
 Type no to display the object 
 Type no to hex dump the object 
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 Type yes to okay to change 
Next use daemon_edit to have egd.pl act as a daemon.  Issue SAK. 
Type daemon_edit  
Type add.   
Enter the “egd” as the name of the daemon.   
For the command line type: egd.pl   
For the arguments, use “/tmp/entropy”   
Type enter for environment setting 
Answer yes to starting the daemon at startup.   
Answer no to high integrity.   
Answer no to controls a device.   
The security level for the daemon should be min.   
The integrity level should be il3.   
Run the daemon as user network and group network.   
If seeing the current starting order for daemons is desired, type yes, 
otherwise say no.   
To add the daemon to the end of the list, press enter otherwise enter a 
starting index.   
Press enter for the delay at startup question. 
Press enter for the delay at stop. 
Type “entropy gathering daemon” for the description.   
A message stating that the daemon was added should appear.  To start the 
daemon, use the trusted start_daemon command. A list of available daemons will be 
presented.  Choose egd.  A message stating that the daemon has started should appear.  
To verify this, use the proc_edit command and type list.  There should be an entry for 
egd.pl.  It is possible that the daemon may not be able to keep up with all entropy 
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requests.  It is better to start this daemon as soon as possible and leave it running 
continuously. 
Each OpenSSH daemon will require its own entropy daemon.  The entropy 
daemons will have to have the same session levels as its corresponding OpenSSH 
daemon.  For instance, if the OpenSSH daemon will be run at sl1:il3, then an entropy 
daemon will have to run with those same levels.  Repeat the above process three times 
starting at daemon_edit, specifying the session levels as those of the network interfaces 
(typically they will be sl1:il3, sl2:il3 and sl3:il3).  You will also have to give each 
daemon a unique name, so for the daemon running at sl1:il3, the name should be egd-
nipr.  The daemon running at sl2:il3 should have the name egd-sipr.  The daemon running 
at sl3:il3 should have the name egd-jwics.      
2.  Zlib compression libraries and tools 
a. Installation Instructions 
The zlib libraries should be installed by the admin user.  The source can be 
downloaded from http://www.gzip.org/zlib/.    Move the file “zlib.tar” to the XTS-400 
and save in the /usr/src directory.  Login as admin at sl0 and oss (il3, all compartments).  
Type tar  -xvf  zlib.tar.  This will create a directory called “zlib”.  Change to the “zlib” 
directory.  Run the following commands: 
make  test 
make  install 
The make install will install the libz.* files in the “/usr/local/lib” directory 
and zlib.h in the “/usr/local/include” directory.   
3.  OpenSSL Encryption Libraries and Tools 
a. Installation Instructions 
The source for OpenSSL can be obtained from http://www.openssl.org.  
The current version is 0.9.7d.  Download the source code  or use source on the CD-ROM 
and load it onto the XTS-400 in the “/usr/src” directory.  Login as admin at sl0 and oss.  
Un-pack the file by issuing the following command: tar  -zxvf  openssl.tar.gz.  This will 
uncompress the files into a directory called “openssl-0.9.7d”.  Navigate to that directory 
and issue the following commands: 
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./config  zlib 
make 
make  test 
make  install 
The configuration option, zlib, will allow OpenSSL to use the zlib 
libraries for compression.  The make command will compile the source.  The make test 
command will test the compilation and the encryption algorithms.  The make install 
command will install the libraries in “/usr/local” directory.  The man pages will not 
install properly, but they are not needed in order for openssl to function properly. 
B.  OPENSSH 
Create a directory called “src” under the “/usr/local” directory.  This directory 
should have the levels: min:oss, this directory and its contents will be downgraded later.  
The MYSEA software must be installed in the “/usr/local/mysea” directory.   
Login as admin at min:oss.  Copy the openssh.tar.gz file into the “/usr/local/src” 




Enter /usr/local/src/openssh.tar.gz for the pathname 
Type yes to modify the access level 
Type min for security level 
Type il3 for integrity level 
Type yes for the question, “is the level correct?” 
Hit enter for new owner name 
Hit enter for new group name 
Type no for modify discretionary access 
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Type no for display the object 
Type yes for okay to change 
While still in fsm, 
Type change 
Enter /usr/local/src for the pathname 
Type yes to modify the access level 
Enter min for security level 
Enter il3 for the integrity level 
Hit enter for new owner name 
Hit enter for new group name 
Type no for modify discretionary access 
Type no for display the object 
Type yes for okay to change 
Uncompress and unpack the files by issuing the following command: tar-zxvf 
openssh.tar.gz.  This will create a directory called “openssh-3.7.1p2”.  Navigate to that 
directory and type the following commands: 
./configure  --prefix=/usr/local/src  --with-prngd-socket=/tmp/entropy  --with-
default-path=:/xts/untrusted/bin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/X11R6/bin  --disable-lastlog  --
disable-utmp  --disable-utmpx  --disable-wtmp  --disable-wtmpx  --with-ldflags=-
L/usr/local/mysea/lib  --with-libs=”-lut_oss –lut_xts –loss” 
make 
make  install 
The make install command will create directories within the “/usr/local/src” 
directory.  The directories are: “bin”, “etc”, “libexec”, “sbin”, “share” and “man”.  Verify 
that the file sshd is in the “/usr/local/src/sbin” directory.  Navigate to the 
“/usr/local/src/etc” directory and copy the “sshd_config” file three times. Name each of 
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the three files a different name such as “sshd_config-nipr”, “sshd_config-sipr” and 
“sshd_config-jwics”.  Modify each of these three files as described in Appendix C. 
Invoke the Trusted Path with the SAK.  Set session levels to min:max.   
Run the tp_edit command.   
Enter cd to change to the “/system” directory.   
Type add to install the OpenSSH daemon in this directory.   
For program name type sshd  
For path enter “/usr/local/src/sbin/sshd”.   
For maximum integrity enter admin. 
For minimum integrity enter il0.   
For assign privileges type yes and answer no to all privileges except for “Set 
owner/group”.   
A message will be displayed stating that the program has been installed.  Exit 
tp_edit. 
Start daemon_edit.   
Type add.   
For the daemon name, specify three different daemon names for the three levels at 
which the OpenSSH daemons will run.  Three suggested names are sshd-nipr, sshd-sipr, 
sshd-jwics.   
For the command line type sshd.   
For arguments type “-f /usr/local/src/etc/<sshd_config>”.  Specify the 
configuration file that corresponds to the level of the network interface and the level of 
the daemon.  For example, if the daemon is to run at sl1:il3, then the config file is 
“sshd_config-nipr”. 
For the environment setting type TERM=/dev/console.  This is to allow the 
daemon to start from the console, but it will detach from it.   
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Type no for start daemon at start up.  This can be changed to yes, but make sure 
that the OpenSSH daemons start after the entropy daemons.   
Enter yes for high integrity program.   
Answer no for the daemon will control a device.   
Enter the security level, either sl1, sl2 or sl3.   
Type il3 for the integrity level for all three daemons.   
For user and group names type network.   
Type no for display start index.   
Hit enter for end of list.   
Enter 0 for delay in starting the daemon if answered no to start daemon at startup.  
If the question “start daemon at startup” was answered with yes, then enter a delay of 60 
seconds.  The entropy daemons need time to generate entropy. 
Enter 0 for delay in stopping daemon.  For the daemon description, type the 
classification of the daemon followed by “SSH Daemon”.   
Issue SAK. 
Set levels to min:max.   
Type fsm.   
Change the owner and group of the sshd, and the configuration and host keys files 
to the network user: 
 Type change 
 Enter “/system/sshd” for the path. 
 Do not modify the levels. 
 Enter “network” for the owner. 
 Enter “network” for the group. 
 Do not modify the discretionary access. 
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 Type no for display. 
 Type yes for Okay to change. 
 Type change (Repeat this process for all of the configuration files) 
 Enter “/usr/local/src/etc/<config-file> 
 Do not modify the mandatory access levels. 
 Enter “network” for owner and group. 
 Do not modify the discretionary access. 
 Type no to display 
 Type yes for Okay to change. 
 Type change.  Repeat this process for the three private keys: 
/usr/local/src/etc/ssh_host_rsa_key, /usr/local/src/etc/ssh_host_dsa_key, and 
/usr/local/src/etc/ssh_host_key. 
 Enter /usr/local/src/etc/<private key file> 
 Do not modify the mandatory access levels 
 Type “network” for the owner and group. 
 Do not modify the discretionary access. 
To manually start the daemons, issue SAK. 
Type start_daemon and enter the names of the daemons.  To verify that the 
daemons have started, set the session level to max:max and then run proc_edit.  Type list 
and all three daemons should be present.  If ssh-rand-helper is also listed in proc_edit, 
then there is not enough entropy and the OpenSSH daemon is trying to generate more.  
Wait about 10 minutes or more before attempting to login.  Because the daemon was 
installed using tp_edit, the command stop_daemon will not terminate the daemon.  Using 
the “remove” function of proc_edit will not stop the daemon either.  The only way to 
terminate the daemon is with a system reboot. 
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Edit the “/etc/passwd” to include the proper default group with each user.  The 
fourth field is what is used to identify the groups.  By default, these numbers will be 0.  
Change to the appropriate group ID for the user.   
 Issue SAK 
 Type sl 
 max is the security level 
  max is the integrity level 
 Issue SAK 
 Type ua_edit 
 Type display 
 Enter the user name of the user that will be allowed to login remotely via 
OpenSSH.   
 Look for the user’s default group and remember it or write it down 
 Type exit 
 Issue SAK 
 Type sl 
 min is the security level 
 oss is the integrity level 
 Issue SAK and type run 
 Change directories to the /etc directory 
 Type vi group 
 Look for the user’s default group and record the group ID number 
 Exit vi 
 Type vi passwd 
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 Look for the user’s entry and change the fourth field from 0 to the group 
ID of the user’s default group 
Each time a user is added, the “/etc/passwd” file will have to be updated.  The 
xtsmkpasswd command, does not create a correct passwd file.     
C. PUTTY INSTALLATION 
This is the Windows SSH client.  Do not attempt to install this on a Linux system 
or the XTS-400. 
Login to the Windows machine as Administrator. 
Copy the installer from the CD. 
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APPENDIX B: SOURCE CODE LISTING 
The following files are the source code files that were modified in order to port 




 * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
the 
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the 
distribution. 
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR 
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES 
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE 
DISCLAIMED. 
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, 
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, 
BUT 
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF 
USE, 
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON 
ANY 
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE 
USE OF 






/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.103 2003/09/16 01:52:19 dtucker Exp $ */ 
 
 





  SHUT_RD = 0,  /* No more receptions.  */ 
  SHUT_WR,   /* No more transmissions.  */ 
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  SHUT_RDWR   /* No more receptions or transmissions.  */ 
}; 
# define SHUT_RD   SHUT_RD 
# define SHUT_WR   SHUT_WR 




# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY          0x10 
# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT        0x08 
# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY       0x04 
# define IPTOS_LOWCOST           0x02 
# define IPTOS_MINCOST           IPTOS_LOWCOST 
#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */ 
 
#ifndef MAXPATHLEN 
# ifdef PATH_MAX 
#  define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX 
# else /* PATH_MAX */ 
#  define MAXPATHLEN 64 /* Should be safe */ 
# endif /* PATH_MAX */ 
#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */ 
 
#ifndef STDIN_FILENO 
# define STDIN_FILENO    0 
#endif 
#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO 
# define STDOUT_FILENO   1 
#endif 
#ifndef STDERR_FILENO 
# define STDERR_FILENO   2 
#endif 
 
#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set 
*/ 
#ifdef NGROUPS 
#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS 
#else 




#ifndef O_NONBLOCK /* Non Blocking Open */ 




# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR)) 
#endif /* S_ISDIR */ 
 
#ifndef S_ISREG  
# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG)) 
#endif /* S_ISREG */ 
 
#ifndef S_ISLNK 
# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) 




# define S_IXUSR   0000100 /* execute/search permission, 
*/ 
# define S_IXGRP   0000010 /* execute/search permission, 
*/ 
# define S_IXOTH   0000001 /* execute/search permission, 
*/ 
# define _S_IWUSR   0000200 /* write permission, */ 
# define S_IWUSR   _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */ 
# define S_IWGRP   0000020 /* write permission, group */ 
# define S_IWOTH   0000002 /* write permission, other */ 
# define S_IRUSR   0000400 /* read permission, owner */ 
# define S_IRGRP   0000040 /* read permission, group */ 
# define S_IROTH   0000004 /* read permission, other */ 
# define S_IRWXU   0000700 /* read, write, execute */ 
# define S_IRWXG   0000070 /* read, write, execute */ 
# define S_IRWXO   0000007 /* read, write, execute */ 
#endif /* S_IXUSR */ 
 
#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS) 




# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1) 
#endif 
 
/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this constant in the system headers */ 
#ifdef MISSING_NFDBITS 




SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but 
including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6 
*/ 
#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK 
#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001) 
#endif 
 
/* Types */ 
 
/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ 








# if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1) 
typedef char int8_t; 
# else 
#  error "8 bit int type not found." 
# endif 
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# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) 
typedef short int int16_t; 
# else 
#  ifdef _UNICOS 
#   if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) 
typedef short int16_t; 
#   else 
typedef long  int16_t; 
#   endif 
#  else 
#   error "16 bit int type not found." 
#  endif /* _UNICOS */ 
# endif 
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) 
typedef int int32_t; 
# else 
#  ifdef _UNICOS 
typedef long  int32_t; 
#  else 
#   error "32 bit int type not found." 




/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ 
#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T 
# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T 
typedef uint8_t u_int8_t; 
typedef uint16_t u_int16_t; 
typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; 
# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 
# else 
#  if (SIZEOF_CHAR == 1) 
typedef unsigned char u_int8_t; 
#  else 
#   error "8 bit int type not found." 
#  endif 
#  if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) 
typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t; 
#  else 
#   ifdef _UNICOS 
#    if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) 
typedef unsigned short u_int16_t; 
#    else 
typedef unsigned long  u_int16_t; 
#    endif 
#   else 
#    error "16 bit int type not found." 
#   endif 
#  endif 
#  if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) 
typedef unsigned int u_int32_t; 
#  else 
#   ifdef _UNICOS 
typedef unsigned long  u_int32_t; 
#   else 
#    error "32 bit int type not found." 
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#   endif 





/* 64-bit types */ 
#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T 
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) 
typedef long int int64_t; 
# else 
#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) 
typedef long long int int64_t; 




# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) 
typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t; 
# else 
#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) 
typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t; 





typedef unsigned char u_char; 
# define HAVE_U_CHAR 
#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */ 
 
#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX 
#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX 
#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */ 
 
#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T 
typedef unsigned int size_t; 
# define HAVE_SIZE_T 
#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */ 
 
#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T 
typedef int ssize_t; 
# define HAVE_SSIZE_T 
#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */ 
 
#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T 
typedef long clock_t; 
# define HAVE_CLOCK_T 
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */ 
 
#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 
typedef int sa_family_t; 
# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 
#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */ 
 
#ifndef HAVE_PID_T 
typedef int pid_t; 
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# define HAVE_PID_T 
#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */ 
 
#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 
typedef int sig_atomic_t; 
# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 
#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */ 
 
#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T 
typedef int mode_t; 
# define HAVE_MODE_T 
#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */ 
 
#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) 
# define ss_family __ss_family 




struct sockaddr_un { 
 short sun_family;  /* AF_UNIX */ 
 char sun_path[108];  /* path name (gag) */ 
}; 
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ 
 
#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE) 
#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE 
struct winsize { 
      unsigned short ws_row;          /* rows, in characters */ 
      unsigned short ws_col;          /* columns, in character */ 
      unsigned short ws_xpixel;       /* horizontal size, pixels */ 




/* *-*-nto-qnx does not define this type in the system headers */ 
#ifdef MISSING_FD_MASK 
 typedef unsigned long int fd_mask; 
#endif 
 
/* Paths */ 
 
#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL 
# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" 
#endif 
#ifndef _PATH_CSHELL 
# define _PATH_CSHELL "/bin/csh" 
#endif 
#ifndef _PATH_SHELLS 




# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH 
#  undef _PATH_STDPATH 
# endif 





















# define MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY 
#endif 
 
#if !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR) 
# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR 
#endif /* !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR) */ 
 
#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN 
# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" 
#endif 
 
/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */ 
#ifdef XAUTH_PATH 
#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH 
#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */ 
 
/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */ 
#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH 
#  ifdef __hpux 
#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u" 
#  else 
#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u" 
#  endif 
#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */ 
#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH 
 
#ifndef _PATH_TTY 
# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" 
#endif 
 
/* Macros */ 
 
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H) 




# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) 
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#define timersub(a, b, result)     \ 
   do {        \ 
      (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec;  \ 
      (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec;  \ 
      if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) {    \ 
  --(result)->tv_sec;     \ 
  (result)->tv_usec += 1000000;    \ 
      }        \ 




#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) {     \ 
 (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec;     \ 





#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) {     \ 
 (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec;     \ 









# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ 
 ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) 
&& \ 
  (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff))) 
#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */ 
 
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) 
# define __attribute__(x) 
#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */ 
 
/* *-*-nto-qnx doesn't define this macro in the system headers */ 
#ifdef MISSING_HOWMANY 












/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */ 
#ifndef CMSG_LEN 




/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length 
len */ 
#ifndef CMSG_SPACE 




/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */ 
#ifndef CMSG_DATA 
#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct 
cmsghdr))) 
#endif /* CMSG_DATA */ 
 
/* 
 * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel 
returns 
 * an empty list for some reasons. 
 */ 
#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR 
#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \ 
 ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ 
  (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \ 
  (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) 
#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */ 
 
 
/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */ 
 
#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || 
defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO)) 




# undef getopt 
# undef opterr 
# undef optind 
# undef optopt 
# undef optreset 
# undef optarg 
# define getopt(ac, av, o)  BSDgetopt(ac, av, o) 
# define opterr             BSDopterr 
# define optind             BSDoptind 
# define optopt             BSDoptopt 
# define optreset           BSDoptreset 




/* In older versions of libpam, pam_strerror takes a single argument */ 
#ifdef HAVE_OLD_PAM 
# define PAM_STRERROR(a,b) pam_strerror((b)) 
#else 




# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) 
#else 
# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) 
#endif 
 
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) 
# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO 
#endif 
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO) 
# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO 
#endif 
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) 
# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 
#endif 
 
#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) 
# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n)) 
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */ 
 
#if defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) 
#  define USE_VHANGUP 
#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */ 
 
#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID 
# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0) 
#endif 
 
/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */ 
#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 
0x0090600f) 
# define OPENSSL_free(x) Free(x) 
#endif 
 
#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__) 
#  define __func__ __FUNCTION__ 
#elif !defined(HAVE___func__) 
#  define __func__ "" 
#endif 
 
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) 




 * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating 
with the 
 * client program.  Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems. 
 * 
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 * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have 
problems 
 * but you may need to set it yourself 
 */ 
//MYSEA: Manually changed to use pipes 
#define USE_PIPES 1  
 
/** 
 ** login recorder definitions 
 **/ 
 
/* FIXME: put default paths back in */ 
#ifndef UTMP_FILE 
#  ifdef _PATH_UTMP 
#    define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP 
#  else 
#    ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE 
#      define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE 
#    endif 
#  endif 
#endif 
#ifndef WTMP_FILE 
#  ifdef _PATH_WTMP 
#    define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP 
#  else 
#    ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE 
#      define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE 
#    endif 
#  endif 
#endif 
/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */ 
#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE 
#  ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG 
#    define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG 
#  else 
#    ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE 
#      define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE 
#    endif 




/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */ 
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN) 
#  define USE_LOGIN 
 
#else 
/* Simply select your favourite login types. */ 
/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */ 
#  if defined(UTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX) 
#    define USE_UTMPX 
#  endif 
#  if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP) 
#    define USE_UTMP 
#  endif 
#  if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX) 
#    define USE_WTMPX 
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#  endif 
#  if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP) 
#    define USE_WTMP 




/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */ 
#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) 
#  define USE_LASTLOG 
#endif 
 
/** end of login recorder definitions */ 
 
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */ 
B. SESSION.C 
/* 
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland 
 *                    All rights reserved 
 * 
 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software 
 * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this 
 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is 
 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must 
be 
 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". 
 * 
 * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. 
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
the 
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the 
distribution. 
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR 
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES 
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE 
DISCLAIMED. 
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, 
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, 
BUT 
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF 
USE, 
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON 
ANY 
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE 
USE OF 
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/* func */ 
 
Session *session_new(void); 
void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int); 
void session_pty_cleanup(void *); 
void session_proctitle(Session *); 
int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *); 
void do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *); 
void do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *); 
void do_exec(Session *, const char *); 
void do_login(Session *, const char *); 
#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 
static void do_pre_login(Session *s); 
#endif 
void do_child(Session *, const char *); 
void do_motd(void); 
int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); 
 
static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *); 
static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *); 
 
static int session_pty_req(Session *); 
 
/* import */ 
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extern ServerOptions options; 
extern char *__progname; 
extern int log_stderr; 
extern int debug_flag; 
extern u_int utmp_len; 
extern int startup_pipe; 
extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); 
extern Buffer loginmsg; 
 
/* original command from peer. */ 
const char *original_command = NULL; 
 
/* data */ 







/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ 
static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; 
static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; 
 





 struct passwd *pw = _pw; 
 
 if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { 
  temporarily_use_uid(pw); 
  unlink(auth_sock_name); 
  rmdir(auth_sock_dir); 
  auth_sock_name = NULL; 





auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) 
{ 
 Channel *nc; 
 int sock; 
 struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; 
 
 if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { 
  error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ 
 temporarily_use_uid(pw); 
 
 /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ 
 auth_sock_name = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); 
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 auth_sock_dir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); 
 strlcpy(auth_sock_dir, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX", MAXPATHLEN); 
 
 /* Create private directory for socket */ 
 if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { 
  packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: " 
      "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
  restore_uid(); 
  xfree(auth_sock_name); 
  xfree(auth_sock_dir); 
  auth_sock_name = NULL; 
  auth_sock_dir = NULL; 
  return 0; 
 } 
 snprintf(auth_sock_name, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/agent.%ld", 
   auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); 
 
 /* delete agent socket on fatal() */ 
 fatal_add_cleanup(auth_sock_cleanup_proc, pw); 
 
 /* Create the socket. */ 
 sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); 
 if (sock < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* Bind it to the name. */ 
 memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); 
 sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; 
 strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, 
sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); 
 
 if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 
0) 
  packet_disconnect("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* Restore the privileged uid. */ 
 restore_uid(); 
 
 /* Start listening on the socket. */ 
 if (listen(sock, 5) < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ 
 nc = channel_new("auth socket", 
     SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, 
     CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 
     0, "auth socket", 1); 
 strlcpy(nc->path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(nc->path)); 











  * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for 
  * authentication. 
  */ 
 alarm(0); 
 if (startup_pipe != -1) { 
  close(startup_pipe); 
  startup_pipe = -1; 
 } 
 
 /* setup the channel layer */ 
 if (!no_port_forwarding_flag && options.allow_tcp_forwarding) 
  channel_permit_all_opens(); 
 
 if (compat20) 
  do_authenticated2(authctxt); 
 else 
  do_authenticated1(authctxt); 
 
 /* remove agent socket */ 
 if (auth_sock_name != NULL) 
  auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); 
#ifdef KRB5 
 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup) 





 * Prepares for an interactive session.  This is called after the user 
has 
 * been successfully authenticated.  During this message exchange, 
pseudo 
 * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent 
forwardings 





 Session *s; 
 char *command; 
 int success, type, screen_flag; 
 int enable_compression_after_reply = 0; 
 u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0; 
 
 s = session_new(); 
 s->authctxt = authctxt; 
 s->pw = authctxt->pw; 
 
 /* 
  * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a 
shell 
  * or a command. 
  */ 
 for (;;) { 
  success = 0; 
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  /* Get a packet from the client. */ 
  type = packet_read(); 
 
  /* Process the packet. */ 
  switch (type) { 
  case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION: 
   compression_level = packet_get_int(); 
   packet_check_eom(); 
   if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) { 
    packet_send_debug("Received illegal compression 
level %d.", 
        compression_level); 
    break; 
   } 
   if (!options.compression) { 
    debug2("compression disabled"); 
    break; 
   } 
   /* Enable compression after we have responded with 
SUCCESS. */ 
   enable_compression_after_reply = 1; 
   success = 1; 
   break; 
 
  case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY: 
   success = session_pty_req(s); 
   break; 
 
  case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING: 
   s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len); 
   s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len); 
 
   screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() & 
       SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER; 
   debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", 
screen_flag); 
 
   if (packet_remaining() == 4) { 
    if (!screen_flag) 
     debug2("Buggy client: " 
         "X11 screen flag missing"); 
    s->screen = packet_get_int(); 
   } else { 
    s->screen = 0; 
   } 
   packet_check_eom(); 
   success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); 
   if (!success) { 
    xfree(s->auth_proto); 
    xfree(s->auth_data); 
    s->auth_proto = NULL; 
    s->auth_data = NULL; 
   } 
   break; 
 
  case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING: 
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   if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) { 
    debug("Authentication agent forwarding not 
permitted for this authentication."); 
    break; 
   } 
   debug("Received authentication agent forwarding 
request."); 
   success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); 
   break; 
 
  case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST: 
   if (no_port_forwarding_flag) { 
    debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this 
authentication."); 
    break; 
   } 
   if (!options.allow_tcp_forwarding) { 
    debug("Port forwarding not permitted."); 
    break; 
   } 
   debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request."); 
   channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 
0, options.gateway_ports); 
   success = 1; 
   break; 
 
  case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE: 
   if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0) 
    success = 1; 
   break; 
 
  case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL: 
  case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD: 
   if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) { 
    command = packet_get_string(&dlen); 
    debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command); 
    do_exec(s, command); 
    xfree(command); 
   } else { 
    do_exec(s, NULL); 
   } 
   packet_check_eom(); 
   debug("Calling Session Close"); 
   session_close(s); 
   debug("Returned from Session Close called from do 
Authenticated1"); 
   return; 
 
  default: 
   /* 
    * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored, 
    * and a failure message is returned. 
    */ 
   logit("Unknown packet type received after 
authentication: %d", type); 
   
} 
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  packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : 
SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); 
  packet_send(); 
  packet_write_wait(); 
 
  /* Enable compression now that we have replied if 
appropriate. */ 
  if (enable_compression_after_reply) { 
   enable_compression_after_reply = 0; 
   packet_start_compression(compression_level); 





 * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  
This 
 * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent 
after 
 * setting up file descriptors and such. 
 */ 
void 
do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) 
{ 
 pid_t pid; 
 
#ifdef USE_PIPES 
 int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; 
 /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ 
 if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0 || pipe(perr) < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("Could not create pipes: %.100s", 
      strerror(errno)); 
#else /* USE_PIPES */ 
 int inout[2], err[2]; 
 /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ 
 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0 || 
     socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("Could not create socket pairs: %.100s", 
      strerror(errno)); 
#endif /* USE_PIPES */ 
 if (s == NULL) 





 if (options.use_pam) { 
  do_pam_setcred(1); 
  if (is_pam_password_change_required()) 
   packet_disconnect("Password change required but no " 
       "TTY available"); 
 } 
#endif /* USE_PAM */ 
 
 /* Fork the child. */ 
 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { 
  fatal_remove_all_cleanups(); 
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  /* Child.  Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. 
*/ 
  log_init(__progname, options.log_level, 
options.log_facility, log_stderr); 
 
  /* 
   * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD 
   * setlogin() affects the entire process group. 
   */ 
  if (setsid() < 0) 
   error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 
#ifdef USE_PIPES 
  /* 
   * Redirect stdin.  We close the parent side of the socket 
   * pair, and make the child side the standard input. 
   */ 
  close(pin[1]); 
  if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) 
   perror("dup2 stdin"); 
  close(pin[0]); 
 
  /* Redirect stdout. */ 
  close(pout[0]); 
  if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) 
   perror("dup2 stdout"); 
  close(pout[1]); 
 
  /* Redirect stderr. */ 
  close(perr[0]); 
  if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0) 
   perror("dup2 stderr"); 
  close(perr[1]); 
#else /* USE_PIPES */ 
  /* 
   * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr.  Stdin and stdout 
will 
   * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly 
rdist) 
   * seem to depend on it. 
   */ 
  close(inout[1]); 
  close(err[1]); 
  if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */ 
   perror("dup2 stdin"); 
  if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout.  Note: same socket 
as stdin. */ 
   perror("dup2 stdout"); 
  if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */ 
   perror("dup2 stderr"); 
#endif /* USE_PIPES */ 
 
#ifdef _UNICOS 




  /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ 
  do_child(s, command); 
  /* NOTREACHED */ 
 } 
#ifdef _UNICOS 
 signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); 
#endif /* _UNICOS */ 
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN 
 if (is_winnt) 
  cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); 
#endif 
 if (pid < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 s->pid = pid; 
 /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ 
 packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL); 
#ifdef USE_PIPES 





 if (compat20) { 
  session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], s->is_subsystem ? -1 : 
perr[0]); 
 } else { 
  /* Enter the interactive session. */ 
  server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]); 
  /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */ 
 } 
#else /* USE_PIPES */ 






  * Enter the interactive session.  Note: server_loop must be able 
to 
  * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. 
  */ 
 if (compat20) { 
  session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], s->is_subsystem ? -1 
: err[1]); 
 } else { 
  server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]); 
  /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */ 
 } 




 * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty.  
This 
 * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent 
after 
 * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, 
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 * lastlog, and other such operations. 
 */ 
void 
do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) 
{ 
 int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; 
 pid_t pid; 
 if (s == NULL) 
 { 
  fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); 
 } 
 ptyfd = s->ptyfd; 
 ttyfd = s->ttyfd; 
 
#if defined(USE_PAM) 
 if (options.use_pam) { 
  do_pam_set_tty(s->tty); 
  do_pam_setcred(1); 
 } 
#endif 
 /* Fork the child. */ 
 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { 
  fatal_remove_all_cleanups(); 
  /* Child.  Reinitialize the log because the pid has 
changed. */ 
  log_init(__progname, options.log_level, 
options.log_facility, log_stderr); 
  /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ 
  close(ptyfd); 
 
  /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ 
  pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); 
 
  /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ 
  if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0) 
  { 
   error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); 
  } 
  if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0) 
  { 
   error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); 
  } 
  if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0) 
  { 
   error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); 
  } 
 
  /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ 
  close(ttyfd); 
 
  /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ 
   
#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA 
  if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) { 
#ifdef _UNICOS 
   cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir 
*/ 
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#endif /* _UNICOS */ 
   do_login(s, command); 
  } 
# ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 
  else 




  /* Do common processing for the child, such as execing the 
command. */ 
  do_child(s, command); 
  /* NOTREACHED */ 
 } 
#ifdef _UNICOS 
 signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); 
#endif /* _UNICOS */ 
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN 
 if (is_winnt) 
  cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); 
#endif 
 if (pid < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 s->pid = pid; 
 




  * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as 
the 
  * standard input.  We could use the original descriptor, but 
this 
  * simplifies code in server_loop.  The descriptor is 
bidirectional. 
  */ 
 fdout = dup(ptyfd); 
 if (fdout < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("dup #1 failed: %.100s", 
strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ 
 ptymaster = dup(ptyfd); 
 if (ptymaster < 0) 
  packet_disconnect("dup #2 failed: %.100s", 
strerror(errno)); 
 s->ptymaster = ptymaster; 
 
 /* Enter interactive session. */ 
 packet_set_interactive(1); 
 if (compat20) { 
  session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1); 
 } else { 
  server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1); 









 socklen_t fromlen; 
 struct sockaddr_storage from; 
 pid_t pid = getpid(); 
 
 /* 
  * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, 
let 
  * the address be 0.0.0.0. 
  */ 
 memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); 
 fromlen = sizeof(from); 
 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { 
  if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), 
      (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { 
   debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
   fatal_cleanup(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name, 
     get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), 





 * This is called to fork and execute a command.  If another command is 
 * to be forced, execute that instead. 
 */ 
void 
do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) 
{ 
 if (forced_command) { 
  original_command = command; 
  command = forced_command; 




 if (options.gss_authentication) { 
  temporarily_use_uid(s->pw); 
  ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); 




 if (s->ttyfd != -1) 
 { 





  do_exec_no_pty(s, command); 
 } 
 




/* administrative, login(1)-like work */ 
void 
do_login(Session *s, const char *command) 
{ 
 char *time_string; 
 socklen_t fromlen; 
 struct sockaddr_storage from; 
 struct passwd * pw = s->pw; 
 pid_t pid = getpid(); 
 /* 
  * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, 
let 
  * the address be 0.0.0.0. 
  */ 
 memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); 
 fromlen = sizeof(from); 
 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { 
  if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), 
      (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) { 
   debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
   fatal_cleanup(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote 
host. */ 
  
 if (!use_privsep) 
  record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, 
      get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, 
      options.use_dns), 




  * If password change is needed, do it now. 
  * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. 
  */ 
 if (options.use_pam && is_pam_password_change_required()) { 
  print_pam_messages(); 
  do_pam_chauthtok(); 
  /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */ 
 } 
#endif 
 if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) 
 { 





 if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_password_change_required()) 
  print_pam_messages(); 
#endif /* USE_PAM */ 
 
 /* display post-login message */ 
 if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) { 
  buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1); 





 if (options.print_lastlog && s->last_login_time != 0) { 
  time_string = ctime(&s->last_login_time); 
  if (strchr(time_string, '\n')) 
   *strchr(time_string, '\n') = 0; 
  if (strcmp(s->hostname, "") == 0) 
   printf("Last login: %s\r\n", time_string); 
  else 
   printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, 
       s->hostname); 
 } 










 FILE *f; 
 char buf[256]; 
 
 if (options.print_motd) { 
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 
  f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", 
      "/etc/motd"), "r"); 
#else 
  f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); 
#endif 
  if (f) { 
   while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) 
    fputs(buf, stdout); 
   fclose(f); 






 * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. 
 */ 
int 
check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) 
{ 
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 char buf[256]; 
 struct passwd *pw = s->pw; 
 struct stat st; 
 
 /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ 
 if (command != NULL) 
  return 1; 
 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); 
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 
 if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) 
  return 1; 
#else 
 if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) 
  return 1; 
#endif 




 * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment.  If the 
variable 
 * already exists, its value is overriden. 
 */ 
void 
child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, 
 const char *value) 
{ 
 char **env; 
 u_int envsize; 
 u_int i, namelen; 
 
 /* 
  * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null 
  * entry before continuing. 
  */ 
 if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { 
  *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); 
  *envp[0] = NULL; 




  * Find the slot where the value should be stored.  If the 
variable 
  * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new 
slot 
  * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. 
  */ 
 env = *envp; 
 namelen = strlen(name); 
 for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) 
  if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] 
== '=') 
   break; 
 if (env[i]) { 
  /* Reuse the slot. */ 
  xfree(env[i]); 
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 } else { 
  /* New variable.  Expand if necessary. */ 
  envsize = *envsizep; 
  if (i >= envsize - 1) { 
   if (envsize >= 1000) 
    fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); 
   envsize += 50; 
   env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize * sizeof(char 
*)); 
   *envsizep = envsize; 
  } 
  /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the 
new slot. */ 
  env[i + 1] = NULL; 
 } 
 
 /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate 
slot. */ 
 env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); 





 * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides 
them 
 * into the environment.  If the file does not exist, this does 
nothing. 
 * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts 
with '#') 
 * and assignments of the form name=value.  No other forms are allowed. 
 */ 
static void 
read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, 
 const char *filename) 
{ 
 FILE *f; 
 char buf[4096]; 
 char *cp, *value; 
 u_int lineno = 0; 
 
 f = fopen(filename, "r"); 
 if (!f) 
  return; 
 
 while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { 
  if (++lineno > 1000) 
   fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", 
filename); 
  for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) 
   ; 
  if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') 
   continue; 
  if (strchr(cp, '\n')) 
   *strchr(cp, '\n') = '\0'; 
  value = strchr(cp, '='); 
  if (value == NULL) { 
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   fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno, 
       filename); 
   continue; 
  } 
  /* 
   * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to 
   * the value string. 
   */ 
  *value = '\0'; 
  value++; 







 * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not 
present. 
 */ 
static char * 
child_get_env(char **env, const char *name) 
{ 
 int i; 
 size_t len; 
 
 len = strlen(name); 
 for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++) 
  if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=') 
   return(env[i] + len + 1); 




 * Read /etc/default/login. 
 * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK. 
 */ 
static void 
read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) 
{ 
 char **tmpenv = NULL, *var; 
 u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0; 
 mode_t mask; 
 
 /* 
  * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's 
environment, 
  * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're 
  * interested in. 
  */ 
 read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, 
"/etc/default/login"); 
 
 if (tmpenv == NULL) 
  return; 
 
 if (uid == 0) 
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  var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH"); 
 else 
  var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH"); 
 if (var != NULL) 
  child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var); 
  
 if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL) 
  if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1) 
   umask(mask); 
  
 for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++) 
  xfree(tmpenv[i]); 
 xfree(tmpenv); 
} 
#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ 
 
void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) 
{ 
 char *var_name, *var_val; 
 int i; 
 
 if (source == NULL) 
  return; 
 
 for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) { 
  var_name = xstrdup(source[i]); 
  if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) { 
   xfree(var_name); 
   continue; 
  } 
  *var_val++ = '\0'; 
 
  debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); 
  child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); 
   




static char ** 
do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) 
{ 
 char buf[256]; 
 u_int i, envsize; 
 char **env, *laddr, *path = NULL; 
 struct passwd *pw = s->pw; 
 
 /* Initialize the environment. */ 
 envsize = 100; 
 env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof(char *)); 




  * The Windows environment contains some setting which are 
  * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. 
  */ 
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 /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter  
  * the childs environment as they see fit 
  */ 
 ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); 
#endif 
 
 if (!options.use_login) { 
  /* Set basic environment. */ 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); 
#ifdef _AIX 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); 
#endif 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); 
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 
  if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0) 
   child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); 
  else 
   child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", 
getenv("PATH")); 
#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ 
# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN 
  /* 
   * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains 
   * important components pointing to the system directories, 
   * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better 
   * remains intact here. 
   */ 
#  ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN 
  read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid); 
  path = child_get_env(env, "PATH"); 
#  endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ 
  if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { 
   child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",  
       s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? 
    SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH); 
  } 
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ 
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ 
 
  snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", 
    _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); 
 
  /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); 
 } 
 if (getenv("TZ")) 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); 
 
 /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */ 
 if (!options.use_login) { 
  while (custom_environment) { 
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   struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; 
   char *str = ce->s; 
 
   for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++) 
    ; 
   if (str[i] == '=') { 
    str[i] = 0; 
    child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 
1); 
   } 
   custom_environment = ce->next; 
   xfree(ce->s); 
   xfree(ce); 
  } 
 } 
 
 /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ 
 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", 
     get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port()); 
 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); 
 
 laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); 
 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", 
     get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, 
get_local_port()); 
 xfree(laddr); 
 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); 
 
 if (s->ttyfd != -1) 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); 
 if (s->term) 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); 
 if (s->display) 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); 
 if (original_command) 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", 
      original_command); 
 
#ifdef _UNICOS 
 if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0') 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir); 




  char *cp; 
 
  if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) 
   child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); 
  if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) 
   child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); 




 if (s->authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", 
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  * Pull in any environment variables that may have 
  * been set by PAM. 
  */ 
 if (options.use_pam) { 
  char **p = fetch_pam_environment(); 
 
  copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); 
  free_pam_environment(p); 
 } 
#endif /* USE_PAM */ 
 
 if (auth_sock_name != NULL) 
  child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, 
      auth_sock_name); 
 
 /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ 
 if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) { 
  snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", 
      strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : ""); 
  read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); 
 } 
 if (debug_flag) { 
  /* dump the environment */ 
  fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); 
  for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) 
   fprintf(stderr, "  %.200s\n", env[i]); 
 } 




 * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found 
 * first in this order). 
 */ 
static void 
do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell) 
{ 
 FILE *f = NULL; 
 char cmd[1024]; 
 int do_xauth; 
 struct stat st; 
 
 do_xauth = 
     s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data 
!= NULL; 
 
 /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems */ 
 if (!s->is_subsystem && (stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0)) { 
  snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", 
      shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); 
  if (debug_flag) 
   fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); 
  f = popen(cmd, "w"); 
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  if (f) { 
   if (do_xauth) 
    fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, 
        s->auth_data); 
   pclose(f); 
  } else 
   fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", 
       _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); 
 } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { 
  if (debug_flag) 
   fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, 
       _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); 
  f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); 
  if (f) { 
   if (do_xauth) 
    fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, 
        s->auth_data); 
   pclose(f); 
  } else 
   fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", 
       _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); 
 } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { 
  /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ 
  if (debug_flag) { 
   fprintf(stderr, 
       "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", 
         options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); 
   fprintf(stderr, 
       "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", 
       options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, 
       s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); 
  } 
  snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", 
      options.xauth_location); 
  f = popen(cmd, "w"); 
  if (f) { 
   fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", 
       s->auth_display); 
   fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", 
       s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, 
       s->auth_data); 
   pclose(f); 
  } else { 
   fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", 
       cmd); 





do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) 
{ 
 FILE *f = NULL; 
 char buf[1024]; 
 
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 
 if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) && pw->pw_uid) 
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  f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", _PATH_NOLOGIN, 
      _PATH_NOLOGIN), "r"); 
#else 
 if (pw->pw_uid) 
  f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r"); 
#endif 
 if (f) { 
  /* /etc/nologin exists.  Print its contents and exit. */ 
  logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", 
      pw->pw_name, _PATH_NOLOGIN); 
  while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) 
   fputs(buf, stderr); 
  fclose(f); 
  fflush(NULL); 




/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ 
void 
do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) 
{ 
 //MYSEA: Change these numbers to the UID of the user the daemon 
 //will run as. 
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN 
 if (getuid() == 3 || geteuid() == 3) 




  if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, (char **)NULL) == -1) 
  { 
   fatal("Failed to set process credentials"); 
  } 
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ 
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 
# ifdef __bsdi__ 
  setpgid(0, 0); 
# endif 
  if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, 
      (LOGIN_SETALL & ~LOGIN_SETPATH)) < 0) { 
   perror("unable to set user context"); 
   exit(1); 
  } 
#else 
# if defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) 
  /* Sets login uid for accounting */ 
  if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) 
  { 
   error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno)); 
  } 
# endif /* defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) */ 
 
  if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) 
  { 
   error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); 
  } 
90 
{ 
  if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { 
   perror("setgid"); 
   exit(1); 
  } 
  //MYSEA: initgroups is not implemented on the XTS-400, 
  //for now, it has been commented out. 
  /* Initialize the group list. */ 
  //if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { 
  // perror("initgroups"); 
  // exit(1); 
  //} 
  endgrent(); 
# ifdef USE_PAM 
  /* 
   * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary 
groups.  
   * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() 
call. 
   * Reestablish them here. 
   */ 
  if (options.use_pam) { 
   do_pam_session(); 
   do_pam_setcred(0); 
  } 
# endif /* USE_PAM */ 
# if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || 
defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) 
  irix_setusercontext(pw); 
#  endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || 
defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ 
# ifdef _AIX 
  aix_usrinfo(pw); 
# endif /* _AIX */ 
  /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ 





 if (is_winnt) 
#endif 
 if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) 




launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname) 
 /* Launch login(1). */ 
 
 execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname, 
#ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM 
      (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"), 
#endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */ 
#ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT 
     "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); 
#else 
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     "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); 
#endif 
 







 * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the 
 * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and 
group 
 * ids, and executing the command or shell. 
 */ 
void 
do_child(Session *s, const char *command) 
{ 
 extern char **environ; 
 char **env; 
 char *argv[10]; 
 const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL; 
 struct passwd *pw = s->pw; 
 u_int i; 
 /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ 
 destroy_sensitive_data(); 
 /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */ 
 if (options.use_login && command != NULL) 
  options.use_login = 0; 
 
#ifdef _UNICOS 
 cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command); 
#endif /* _UNICOS */ 
 
 /* 
  * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" 
  * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. 
  */ 
 if (!options.use_login) { 
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA 
  session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); 
  if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) 
   do_motd(); 
#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ 
  do_nologin(pw); 
  do_setusercontext(pw); 




  * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is 
  * legal, and means /bin/sh. 
  */ 
 shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; 
 
 /* 
  * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, 
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  * even if shell is overridden from login.conf 
  */ 
 env = do_setup_env(s, shell); 
 
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 




 /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ 
 if (options.use_login) 
  hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, 
      options.use_dns); 
 /* 
  * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, 
and 
  * the server will still have the socket open, and it is 
important 
  * that we do not shutdown it.  Note that the descriptors cannot 
be 
  * closed before building the environment, as we call 
  * get_remote_ipaddr there. 
  */ 
 if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) 
  close(packet_get_connection_in()); 
 else { 
  close(packet_get_connection_in()); 
  close(packet_get_connection_out()); 
 } 
 /* 
  * Close all descriptors related to channels.  They will still 
remain 
  * open in the parent. 
  */ 




  * Close any extra file descriptors.  Note that there may still 
be 
  * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed 
later. 




  * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don\'t have 
them 
  * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after 
  * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file 
  * descriptors open. 
  */ 
 for (i = 3; i < 64; i++) 
  close(i); 
 
 /* 
  * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, 
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  * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment. 
  */ 
 environ = env; 
 
 /* Change current directory to the user\'s home directory. */ 
 if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { 
  fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: 
%s\n", 
      pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); 
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP 
  if (login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0)) 




 if (!options.use_login) 
  do_rc_files(s, shell); 
 
 /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ 
 signal(SIGPIPE,  SIG_DFL); 
 
 if (options.use_login) { 
  launch_login(pw, hostname); 
  /* NEVERREACHED */ 
 } 
 
 /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ 
 if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL) 
  shell0++; 
 else 
  shell0 = shell; 
 
 /* 
  * If we have no command, execute the shell.  In this case, the 
shell 
  * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate 
that 
  * this is a login shell. 
  */ 
 if (!command) { 
  char argv0[256]; 
 
  /* Start the shell.  Set initial character to '-'. */ 
  argv0[0] = '-'; 
 
  if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1) 
      >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) { 
   errno = EINVAL; 
   perror(shell); 
   exit(1); 
  } 
 
  /* Execute the shell. */ 
  argv[0] = argv0; 
  argv[1] = NULL; 
  execve(shell, argv, env); 
  /* Executing the shell failed. */ 
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  perror(shell); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 /* 
  * Execute the command using the user's shell.  This uses the -c 
  * option to execute the command. 
  */ 
 argv[0] = (char *) shell0; 
 argv[1] = "-c"; 
 argv[2] = (char *) command; 
 argv[3] = NULL; 








 int i; 
 static int did_init = 0; 
 if (!did_init) { 
  debug("session_new: init"); 
  for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
   sessions[i].used = 0; 
  } 
  did_init = 1; 
 } 
 for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
  Session *s = &sessions[i]; 
  if (! s->used) { 
   memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s)); 
   s->chanid = -1; 
   s->ptyfd = -1; 
   s->ttyfd = -1; 
   s->used = 1; 
   s->self = i; 
   debug("session_new: session %d", i); 
   return s; 
  } 
 } 






 int i; 
 for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
  Session *s = &sessions[i]; 
  debug("dump: used %d session %d %p channel %d pid %ld", 
      s->used, 
      s->self, 
      s, 
      s->chanid, 






session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) 
{ 
 Session *s = session_new(); 
 debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); 
 if (s == NULL) { 
  error("no more sessions"); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 s->authctxt = authctxt; 
 s->pw = authctxt->pw; 
 if (s->pw == NULL) 
  fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); 
 debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, 
chanid); 
 s->chanid = chanid; 






 int i; 
 for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
  Session *s = &sessions[i]; 
  if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) 
{ 
   debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); 
   return s; 
  } 
 } 
 debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty); 
 session_dump(); 
 return NULL; 
} 
 
static Session * 
session_by_channel(int id) 
{ 
 int i; 
 for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
  Session *s = &sessions[i]; 
  if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { 
   debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, 
id); 
   return s; 
  } 
 } 
 debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); 
 session_dump(); 
 return NULL; 
} 
 




 int i; 
 debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid); 
 for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
  Session *s = &sessions[i]; 
  if (s->used && s->pid == pid) 
   return s; 
 } 
 error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid); 
 session_dump(); 






 s->col = packet_get_int(); 
 s->row = packet_get_int(); 
 s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); 
 s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); 
 packet_check_eom(); 
 pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s-
>ypixel); 






 u_int len; 
 int n_bytes; 
 if (no_pty_flag) { 
  debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this 
authentication."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (s->ttyfd != -1) { 
  packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a 
pty."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 /* Get the time and hostname when the user last logged in. */ 
  
 if (options.print_lastlog) { 
  s->hostname[0] = '\0'; 
  s->last_login_time = get_last_login_time(s->pw->pw_uid, 
      s->pw->pw_name, s->hostname, sizeof(s->hostname)); 
 } 
 
 s->term = packet_get_string(&len); 
 
 if (compat20) { 
  s->col = packet_get_int(); 
  s->row = packet_get_int(); 
 } else { 
  s->row = packet_get_int(); 
  s->col = packet_get_int(); 
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 } 
 s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); 
 s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); 
 
 if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { 
  xfree(s->term); 
  s->term = NULL; 
 } 
 
 /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ 
 debug("Allocating pty."); 
 if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s-
>tty)))) { 
  if (s->term) 
   xfree(s->term); 
  s->term = NULL; 
  s->ptyfd = -1; 
  s->ttyfd = -1; 
  error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); 
 /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */ 
 if (!compat20) 
  n_bytes = packet_remaining(); 
 tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes); 
 
 /* 
  * Add a cleanup function to clear the utmp entry and record 
logout 
  * time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets 
closed). 
  */ 
 fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s); 
 if (!use_privsep) 
  pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); 
 
 /* Set window size from the packet. */ 











 struct stat st; 
 u_int len; 
 int success = 0; 
 char *cmd, *subsys = packet_get_string(&len); 
 int i; 
 
 packet_check_eom(); 
 logit("subsystem request for %.100s", subsys); 
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 for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { 
  if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { 
   cmd = options.subsystem_command[i]; 
   if (stat(cmd, &st) < 0) { 
    error("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", cmd, 
        strerror(errno)); 
    break; 
   } 
   debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); 
   s->is_subsystem = 1; 
   do_exec(s, cmd); 
   success = 1; 
   break; 
  } 
 } 
 
 if (!success) 
  logit("subsystem request for %.100s failed, subsystem not 
found", 
      subsys); 
 
 xfree(subsys); 






 int success; 
 
 s->single_connection = packet_get_char(); 
 s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL); 
 s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL); 
 s->screen = packet_get_int(); 
 packet_check_eom(); 
 
 success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); 
 if (!success) { 
  xfree(s->auth_proto); 
  xfree(s->auth_data); 
  s->auth_proto = NULL; 
  s->auth_data = NULL; 
 } 







 do_exec(s, NULL); 







 u_int len; 
 char *command = packet_get_string(&len); 
 packet_check_eom(); 
 do_exec(s, command); 
 xfree(command); 






 u_int break_length; 
 
 break_length = packet_get_int(); /* ignored */ 
 packet_check_eom(); 
 
 if (s->ttyfd == -1 || 
     tcsendbreak(s->ttyfd, 0) < 0) 
  return 0; 






 static int called = 0; 
 packet_check_eom(); 
 if (no_agent_forwarding_flag) { 
  debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag"); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (called) { 
  return 0; 
 } else { 
  called = 1; 





session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype) 
{ 
 int success = 0; 
 Session *s; 
 if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { 
  logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req 
%.100s", 
      c->self, rtype); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, 
rtype); 
 /* 
  * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command 
  * or a subsystem is executed 
  */ 
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 if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { 
  if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { 
   success = session_shell_req(s); 
  } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { 
   success = session_exec_req(s); 
  } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { 
   success =  session_pty_req(s); 
  } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { 
   success = session_x11_req(s); 
  } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 
0) { 
   success = session_auth_agent_req(s); 
  } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { 
   success = session_subsystem_req(s); 
  } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { 
   success = session_break_req(s); 
  } 
 } 
 if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { 
  success = session_window_change_req(s); 
 } 




session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr) 
{ 
 if (!compat20) 
  fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0"); 
 /* 
  * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, 
  * we can activate our channel and register the fd's 
  */ 
 if (s->chanid == -1) 
  fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); 
 channel_set_fds(s->chanid, 
     fdout, fdin, fderr, 
     fderr == -1 ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, 
     1, 




 * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted 
abnormally 





 Session *s = session; 
 
 if (s == NULL) { 
  error("session_pty_cleanup: no session"); 
  return; 
 } 








static char * 
sig2name(int sig) 
{ 















 return "SIG@openssh.com"; 
} 
 
  return; 
 
 debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s-
>tty); 
 
 /* Record that the user has logged out. */ 
 if (s->pid != 0) 
  record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name); 
 
 /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ 
 debug("Going to Release PTY\n"); 
 if (getuid() == 0) 
  pty_release(s->tty); 
 debug("Released the PTY\n"); 
 
 /* 
  * Close the server side of the socket pairs.  We must do this 
after 
  * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty 
  * while we're still cleaning up. 
  */ 
 if (close(s->ptymaster) < 0) 
  error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, 
strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* unlink pty from session */ 
 s->ttyfd = -1; 





session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) 
{ 
 Channel *c; 
 
 if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL) 
  fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d", 
      s->self, s->chanid); 
 debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld", 
     s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); 
 
 if (WIFEXITED(status)) { 
  channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); 
  packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status)); 
  packet_send(); 
 } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { 
  channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); 
  packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status))); 
#ifdef WCOREDUMP 
  packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)); 
#else /* WCOREDUMP */ 
  packet_put_char(0); 
#endif /* WCOREDUMP */ 
  packet_put_cstring(""); 
  packet_put_cstring(""); 
  packet_send(); 
 } else { 
  /* Some weird exit cause.  Just exit. */ 
  packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status); 
 } 
 
 /* disconnect channel */ 
 debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid); 
 channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); 
 /* 
  * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will 
be 
  * interested in data we write. 
  * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there 
could 
  * be some more data waiting in the pipe. 
  */ 
 if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) 
  chan_write_failed(c); 






 debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s-
>pid); 
 debug("Starting Session close"); 
 if (s->ttyfd != -1) { 
  fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s); 
  session_pty_cleanup(s); 
 } 
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 if (s->term) 
  xfree(s->term); 
 if (s->display) 
  xfree(s->display); 
 if (s->auth_display) 
  xfree(s->auth_display); 
 if (s->auth_data) 
  xfree(s->auth_data); 
 if (s->auth_proto) 
  xfree(s->auth_proto); 
 s->used = 0; 
 session_proctitle(s); 




session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status) 
{ 
 Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); 
 if (s == NULL) { 
  debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld", 
      (long)pid); 
  return; 
 } 
 if (s->chanid != -1) 





 * this is called when a channel dies before 
 * the session 'child' itself dies 
 */ 
void 
session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg) 
{ 
 Session *s = session_by_channel(id); 
 if (s == NULL) { 
  debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", 
id); 
  return; 
 } 
 debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld", 
     id, (long)s->pid); 
 if (s->pid != 0) { 
  debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", 
id); 
  /* 
   * delay detach of session, but release pty, since 
   * the fd's to the child are already closed 
   */ 
  if (s->ttyfd != -1) { 
   fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s); 
   session_pty_cleanup(s); 
  } 
  return; 
 } 
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 /* detach by removing callback */ 
 channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); 





session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *)) 
{ 
 int i; 
 for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
  Session *s = &sessions[i]; 
  if (s->used) { 
   if (closefunc != NULL) 
    closefunc(s); 
   else 
    session_close(s); 




static char * 
session_tty_list(void) 
{ 
 static char buf[1024]; 
 int i; 
 char *cp; 
 
 buf[0] = '\0'; 
 for (i = 0; i < MAX_SESSIONS; i++) { 
  Session *s = &sessions[i]; 
  if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { 
    
   if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) { 
    cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/'); 
    cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1; 
   } else 
    cp = s->tty + 5; 
    
   if (buf[0] != '\0') 
    strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); 
   strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf); 
  } 
 } 
 if (buf[0] == '\0') 
  strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); 






 if (s->pw == NULL) 
  error("no user for session %d", s->self); 
 else 







 struct stat st; 
 char display[512], auth_display[512]; 
 char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; 
 
 if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) { 
  packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user 
configuration file."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (!options.x11_forwarding) { 
  debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration 
file."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (!options.xauth_location || 
     (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { 
  packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with 
spoofing."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (options.use_login) { 
  packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; " 
      "not compatible with UseLogin=yes."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (s->display != NULL) { 
  debug("X11 display already set."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset, 
     options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, 
     &s->display_number) == -1) { 
  debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ 
 if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) 
  fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 /* 
  * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the 
  * authorization entry is added with xauth(1).  This will be 
  * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays. 
  */ 
 if (options.x11_use_localhost) { 
  snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u", 
      s->display_number, s->screen); 
  snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u", 
      s->display_number, s->screen); 
  s->display = xstrdup(display); 
  s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display); 
 } else { 
#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 
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  struct hostent *he; 
  struct in_addr my_addr; 
 
  he = gethostbyname(hostname); 
  if (he == NULL) { 
   error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); 
   packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 
DISPLAY."); 
   return 0; 
  } 
  memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct 
in_addr)); 
  snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", 
inet_ntoa(my_addr), 
      s->display_number, s->screen); 
#else 
  snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname, 
      s->display_number, s->screen); 
#endif 
  s->display = xstrdup(display); 
  s->auth_display = xstrdup(display); 
 } 
 








 if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) 





 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> 
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland 
 *                    All rights reserved 
 * This program is the ssh daemon.  It listens for connections from 
clients, 
 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and 
forwards 
 * information to/from the application to the user client over an 
encrypted 
 * connection.  This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and 
 * authentication agent connections. 
 * 
 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software 
 * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this 
 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is 
 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must 
be 
 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". 
 * 
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 * SSH2 implementation: 
 * Privilege Separation: 
 * 
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved. 
 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
the 
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the 
distribution. 
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR 
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES 
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE 
DISCLAIMED. 
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, 
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, 
BUT 
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF 
USE, 
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON 
ANY 
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE 
USE OF 



















































int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; 
int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; 
#endif /* LIBWRAP */ 
 
#ifndef O_NOCTTY 









/* Server configuration options. */ 
ServerOptions options; 
 
/* Name of the server configuration file. */ 
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; 
 
/* 
 * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the 
command line. 
 * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. 
 */ 
int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; 
 
/* 
 * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug 
 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system 
 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after 
processing 
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 * the first connection. 
 */ 
int debug_flag = 0; 
 
/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration 
and keys. */ 
int test_flag = 0; 
 
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ 
int inetd_flag = 0; 
 
/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ 
int no_daemon_flag = 0; 
 
/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ 
int log_stderr = 0; 
 





 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP 
 * signal handler. 
 */ 
#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 
int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; 
int num_listen_socks = 0; 
 
/* 
 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != 
NULL, 
 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange 
 */ 
char *client_version_string = NULL; 
char *server_version_string = NULL; 
 




 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this 
 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into 
memory so 
 * that the pages do not get written into swap.  However, there are 
some 
 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in 
principle) 
 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure 
is 
 * not very useful.  Currently, memory locking is not implemented. 
 */ 
struct { 
 Key *server_key;  /* ephemeral server key */ 
 Key *ssh1_host_key;  /* ssh1 host key */ 
 Key **host_keys;  /* all private host keys */ 
 int have_ssh1_key; 
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 int have_ssh2_key; 




 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. 
 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is 
regenerated. 
 */ 
static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0; 
 
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ 
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; 
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; 
 
/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ 
u_char session_id[16]; 
 
/* same for ssh2 */ 
u_char *session_id2 = NULL; 
u_int session_id2_len = 0; 
 
/* record remote hostname or ip */ 
u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; 
 
/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ 
int *startup_pipes = NULL; 
int startup_pipe;  /* in child */ 
 
/* variables used for privilege separation */ 
int use_privsep; 
struct monitor *pmonitor; 
 
/* message to be displayed after login */ 
Buffer loginmsg; 
 




static void do_ssh1_kex(void); 
static void do_ssh2_kex(void); 
 
/*MYSEA: Implement daemon function as daemonize*/ 
int daemonize(int nochdir, int noclose); 
 
/* 





 int i; 
 
 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) 
  close(listen_socks[i]); 







 int i; 
 
 if (startup_pipes) 
  for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) 
   if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) 




 * Signal handler for SIGHUP.  Sshd execs itself when it receives 
SIGHUP; 
 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate 





 int save_errno = errno; 
 
 received_sighup = 1; 
 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); 




 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. 





 logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); 
 close_listen_socks(); 
 close_startup_pipes(); 
 execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); 
 logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", 
saved_argv[0], 















 * SIGCHLD handler.  This is called whenever a child dies.  This will 
then 





 int save_errno = errno; 
 pid_t pid; 
 int status; 
 
 while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || 
     (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) 
  ; 
 
 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); 










 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */ 
 
 /* Log error and exit. */ 





 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm.  Note that this 
 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does 
not 
 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. 
 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution 





 u_int32_t rnd = 0; 
 int i; 
 
 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", 
     sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", 
options.server_key_bits); 
 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) 
  key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); 
 sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, 
     options.server_key_bits); 
 verbose("RSA key generation complete."); 
 
 for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { 
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  if (i % 4 == 0) 
   rnd = arc4random(); 
  sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; 








 int save_errno = errno; 
 
 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); 
 errno = save_errno; 




sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) 
{ 
 int i, mismatch; 
 int remote_major, remote_minor; 
 int major, minor; 
 char *s; 
 char buf[256];   /* Must not be larger than 
remote_version. */ 
 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. 
*/ 
 
 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && 
     (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { 
  major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; 
  minor = 99; 
 } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { 
  major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; 
  minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; 
 } else { 
  major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; 
  minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; 
 } 
 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, 
SSH_VERSION); 
 server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); 
 
 /* Send our protocol version identification. */ 
 if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, 
     strlen(server_version_string)) 
     != strlen(server_version_string)) { 
  logit("Could not write ident string to %s", 
get_remote_ipaddr()); 
  fatal_cleanup(); 
 } 
 
 /* Read other sides version identification. */ 
 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); 
 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { 
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  if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { 
   logit("Did not receive identification string from 
%s", 
       get_remote_ipaddr()); 
   fatal_cleanup(); 
  } 
  if (buf[i] == '\r') { 
   buf[i] = 0; 
   /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ 
   if (i == 12 && 
       strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) 
    break; 
   continue; 
  } 
  if (buf[i] == '\n') { 
   buf[i] = 0; 
   break; 
  } 
 } 
 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; 
 client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); 
 
 /* 
  * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept 
  * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. 
  */ 
 if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", 
     &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { 
  s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; 
  (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); 
  close(sock_in); 
  close(sock_out); 
  logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from 
%s", 
      client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr()); 
  fatal_cleanup(); 
 } 
 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version 
%.100s", 




 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) { 
  logit("probed from %s with %s.  Don't panic.", 
      get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); 
  fatal_cleanup(); 
 } 
 
 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) { 
  logit("scanned from %s with %s.  Don't panic.", 
      get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); 
  fatal_cleanup(); 
 } 
 
 mismatch = 0; 
 switch (remote_major) { 
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 case 1: 
  if (remote_minor == 99) { 
   if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) 
    enable_compat20(); 
   else 
    mismatch = 1; 
   break; 
  } 
  if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { 
   mismatch = 1; 
   break; 
  } 
  if (remote_minor < 3) { 
   packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " 
       "is no longer supported.  Please install a newer 
version."); 
  } else if (remote_minor == 3) { 
   /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ 
   enable_compat13(); 
  } 
  break; 
 case 2: 
  if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { 
   enable_compat20(); 
   break; 
  } 
  /* FALLTHROUGH */ 
 default: 
  mismatch = 1; 
  break; 
 } 
 chop(server_version_string); 
 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); 
 
 if (mismatch) { 
  s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; 
  (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); 
  close(sock_in); 
  close(sock_out); 
  logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. 
%.200s", 
      get_remote_ipaddr(), 
      server_version_string, client_version_string); 








 int i; 
 
 if (sensitive_data.server_key) { 
  key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); 
  sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; 
 } 
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 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { 
  if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { 
   key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); 
   sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; 
  } 
 } 
 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; 
 memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); 
} 
 




 Key *tmp; 
 int i; 
 
 if (sensitive_data.server_key) { 
  tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); 
  key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); 
  sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; 
 } 
 
 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { 
  if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { 
   tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); 
   key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); 
   sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; 
   if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) 
    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; 
  } 
 } 
 







 u_int32_t rnd[256]; 
 gid_t gidset[1]; 
 struct passwd *pw; 
 int i; 
 




 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) 
  rnd[i] = arc4random(); 
 RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); 
 
 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ 
 demote_sensitive_data(); 
 
 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) 
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  fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", 
      SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); 
 memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd)); 
 endpwent(); 
 
 /* Change our root directory */ 
 /*MYSEA: chroot is not supported so comment out for now*/ 
 //if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) 
 // fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, 
 //     strerror(errno)); 
 /*MYSEA:change directory to var run empty*/ 
 if (chdir("/var/empty") == -1) 
  fatal("chdir(\"/var/empty\"): %s", strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* Drop our privileges */ 
 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, 
     (u_int)pw->pw_gid); 
#if 0 
 /* XXX not ready, to heavy after chroot */ 
 do_setusercontext(pw); 
#else 
 gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid; 
 /*MYSEA: setgroups is not implemented*/ 
 /*if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0) 





static Authctxt * 
privsep_preauth(void) 
{ 
 Authctxt *authctxt = NULL; 
 int status; 
 pid_t pid; 
 
 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ 
 pmonitor = monitor_init(); 
 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ 
 pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex; 
 
 pid = fork(); 
 if (pid == -1) { 
  fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); 
 } else if (pid != 0) { 
  fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, 
NULL); 
 
  debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); 
  /*MYSEA: Need to close both of the child's file 
descriptors*/ 
  close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); 
  //close(pmonitor->m_childrecvfd); 
  //close(pmonitor->m_childsendfd); 
  authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(pmonitor); 
  /*MYSEA:now close both of the parent's file descriptors*/ 
  close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); 
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  //close(pmonitor->m_parentrecvfd); 
  //close(pmonitor->m_parentsendfd); 
 
  /* Sync memory */ 
  monitor_sync(pmonitor); 
 
  /* Wait for the child's exit status */ 
  while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) 
   if (errno != EINTR) 
    break; 
 
  /* Reinstall, since the child has finished */ 
  fatal_add_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, NULL); 
 
  return (authctxt); 
 } else { 
  /* child */ 
  /*MYSEA: close the parent side of the file descriptors*/ 
  close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); 
  //close(pmonitor->m_parentrecvfd); 
  //close(pmonitor->m_parentsendfd); 
 
  /* Demote the child */ 
  /*MYSEA: no root user, 3 is network user*/ 
  if (getuid() == 3 || geteuid() == 3) 
   privsep_preauth_child(); 
  setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); 
 } 






 extern Authctxt *x_authctxt; 
 
 /* XXX - Remote port forwarding */ 
 x_authctxt = authctxt; 
 
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING 
 if (1) { 
#else 
 /*MYSEA:network user is 3*/ 
 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 3 || options.use_login) { 
#endif 
  /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ 
  monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); 
  use_privsep = 0; 
  return; 
 } 
 
 /* Authentication complete */ 
 alarm(0); 
 if (startup_pipe != -1) { 
  close(startup_pipe); 




 /* New socket pair */ 
 monitor_reinit(pmonitor); 
 
 pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); 
 if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) 
  fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); 
 else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { 
  fatal_remove_cleanup((void (*) (void *)) packet_close, 
NULL); 
 
  debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); 
  /*MYSEA: close child side of descriptors*/ 
  close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); 
  //close(pmonitor->m_childrecvfd); 
  //close(pmonitor->m_childsendfd); 
  monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); 
 
  /* NEVERREACHED */ 
  exit(0); 
 } 





 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ 
 demote_sensitive_data(); 
 
 /* Drop privileges */ 
 do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); 
 




static char * 
list_hostkey_types(void) 
{ 
 Buffer b; 
 char *p; 
 int i; 
 
 buffer_init(&b); 
 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { 
  Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; 
  if (key == NULL) 
   continue; 
  switch (key->type) { 
  case KEY_RSA: 
  case KEY_DSA: 
   if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) 
    buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); 
   p = key_ssh_name(key); 
   buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); 
   break; 
  } 
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 } 
 buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); 
 p = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); 
 buffer_free(&b); 
 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", p); 






 int i; 
 
 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { 
  Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; 
  if (key != NULL && key->type == type) 
   return key; 
 } 






 if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) 
  return (NULL); 






 int i; 
 
 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { 
  if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) 
   return (i); 
 } 




 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. 
 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability 
 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until 





 double p, r; 
 
 if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) 
  return 0; 
 if (startups >= options.max_startups) 
  return 1; 
 if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) 
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  return 1; 
 
 p  = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; 
 p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; 
 p /= (double) (options.max_startups - 
options.max_startups_begin); 
 p += options.max_startups_rate; 
 p /= 100.0; 
 r = arc4random() / (double) UINT_MAX; 
 
 debug("drop_connection: p %g, r %g", p, r); 






 fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION); 
 fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); 
 fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -f file    Configuration file (default %s)\n", 
_PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -d         Debugging mode (multiple -d means 
more debugging)\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -i         Started from inetd\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -D         Do not fork into daemon mode\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -t         Only test configuration file and 
keys\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -q         Quiet (no logging)\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -p port    Listen on the specified port 
(default: 22)\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -k seconds Regenerate server key every this 
many seconds (default: 3600)\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -g seconds Grace period for authentication 
(default: 600)\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -b bits    Size of server RSA key (default: 
768 bits)\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -h file    File from which to read host key 
(default: %s)\n", 
     _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -u len     Maximum hostname length for utmp 
recording\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -4         Use IPv4 only\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -6         Use IPv6 only\n"); 
 fprintf(stderr, "  -o option  Process the option as if it was 





 * Main program for the daemon. 
 */ 
int 
main(int ac, char **av) 
{ 
 extern char *optarg; 
 extern int optind; 
122 
 int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 
1; 
 pid_t pid; 
 socklen_t fromlen; 
 fd_set *fdset; 
 struct sockaddr_storage from; 
 const char *remote_ip; 
 int remote_port; 
 FILE *f; 
 struct addrinfo *ai; 
 char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; 
 int listen_sock, maxfd; 
 int startup_p[2]; 
 int startups = 0; 
 Authctxt *authctxt; 
 Key *key; 
 int ret, key_used = 0; 
 /*MYSEA: Need to Create File Descriptors so that descriptors will 
start numbering above 2*/ 
 int tf1, tf2, tf3; 
  
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE 
 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); 
#endif 
 __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); 
 init_rng(); 
 /*MYSEA: OPen files so that descriptors are above 2*/ 
 tf1 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL,O_RDWR, 0); 
 tf2 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL,O_RDWR, 0); 
 tf3 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL,O_RDWR, 0); 
 
  
 /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber 
it */ 
 saved_argc = ac; 
 saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1)); 
 for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) 
  saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); 
 saved_argv[i] = NULL; 
 
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE 
 /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ 
 compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); 
 av = saved_argv; 
#endif 
 
 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ 
 initialize_server_options(&options); 
 
 /* Parse command-line arguments. */ 
 while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) 
{ 
  switch (opt) { 
  case '4': 
   IPv4or6 = AF_INET; 
   break; 
  case '6': 
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   IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; 
   break; 
  case 'f': 
   config_file_name = optarg; 
   break; 
  case 'd': 
   if (debug_flag == 0) { 
    debug_flag = 1; 
    options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; 
   } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) 
    options.log_level++; 
   break; 
  case 'D': 
   no_daemon_flag = 1; 
   break; 
  case 'e': 
   log_stderr = 1; 
   break; 
  case 'i': 
   inetd_flag = 1; 
   break; 
  case 'Q': 
   /* ignored */ 
   break; 
  case 'q': 
   options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; 
   break; 
  case 'b': 
   options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg); 
   break; 
  case 'p': 
   options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; 
   if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
   options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); 
   if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
   break; 
  case 'g': 
   if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == 
-1) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
   break; 
  case 'k': 
   if ((options.key_regeneration_time = 
convtime(optarg)) == -1) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration 
interval.\n"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
   break; 
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  case 'h': 
   if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
   options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] 
= optarg; 
   break; 
  case 't': 
   test_flag = 1; 
   break; 
  case 'u': 
   utmp_len = atoi(optarg); 
   if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { 
    fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); 
    exit(1); 
   } 
   break; 
  case 'o': 
   if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg, 
       "command-line", 0) != 0) 
    exit(1); 
   break; 
  case '?': 
  default: 
   usage(); 
   break; 





  * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host 
  * key (unless started from inetd) 
  */ 
 log_init(__progname, 
     options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? 
     SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, 
     options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? 
     SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, 
     log_stderr || !inetd_flag); 
 
#ifdef _UNICOS 
 /* Cray can define user privs drop all prives now! 
  * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! 






 /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. 
*/ 
 read_server_config(&options, config_file_name); 
 





 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ 
 if (optind < ac) { 
  fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION); 
 
 /* load private host keys */ 
 sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files * 
     sizeof(Key *)); 
 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) 
  sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; 
 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; 
 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; 
 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; 
 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; 
 
 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { 
  key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", 
NULL); 
  sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; 
  if (key == NULL) { 
   error("Could not load host key: %s", 
       options.host_key_files[i]); 
   sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; 
   continue; 
  } 
  switch (key->type) { 
  case KEY_RSA1: 
   sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; 
   sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; 
   break; 
  case KEY_RSA: 
  case KEY_DSA: 
   sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; 
   break; 
  } 
  debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, 
      key_type(key)); 
 } 
 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && 
!sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { 
  logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host 
key"); 
  options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; 
 } 
 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && 
!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { 
  logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host 
key"); 
  options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; 
 } 
 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { 
  logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); 
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  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 /* Check certain values for sanity. */ 
 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { 
  if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || 
      options.server_key_bits > 32768) { 
   fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); 
   exit(1); 
  } 
  /* 
   * Check that server and host key lengths differ 
sufficiently. This 
   * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. 
Oh, I 
   * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels 
   */ 
  if (options.server_key_bits > 
      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - 
      SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits < 
      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + 
      SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { 
   options.server_key_bits = 
       BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) 
+ 
       SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; 
   debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it 
differ from host key.", 
       options.server_key_bits); 
  } 
 } 
 
 if (use_privsep) { 
  struct passwd *pw; 
  struct stat st; 
 
  if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) 
   fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", 
       SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); 
  if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || 
      (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) 
   fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", 
       _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); 
 
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN 
  if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && 
      (st.st_uid != getuid () || 
      (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) 
#else  /* MYSEA:Change test to 3 for network user on XTS400*/ 
  if (st.st_uid != 3 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 
0) 
#endif 
   fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " 
       "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); 
 } 
 
 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ 
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 if (test_flag) 
  exit(0); 
 
 /* 
  * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited.  This 
  * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the 
  * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM  
  * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every  
  * module which might be used). 
  */ 
 //MYSEA: setgroups is not implemented 
 //if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) 
 // debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we 
forked). */ 
 if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag) 
  log_stderr = 1; 




  * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, 
disconnect 
  * from the controlling terminal, and fork.  The original process 
  * exits. 
  */ 
 if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { 
#ifdef TIOCNOTTY 
  int fd; 
#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ 
  //MYSEA: Use daemonize function instead of daemon 
  //They are the same thing 
  if (daemonize(0, 0) < 0) 
   fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); 
 
  /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ 
#ifdef TIOCNOTTY 
  fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); 
  if (fd >= 0) { 
   (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); 
   close(fd); 
  } 
#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ 
 } 
 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ 
 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, 
log_stderr); 
 
 /* Initialize the random number generator. */ 
 arc4random_stir(); 
 
 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be 
    unmounted if desired. */ 
 chdir("/"); 
 
 /* ignore SIGPIPE */ 
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 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); 
 
 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */ 
 if (inetd_flag) { 
  int s1; 
  s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are 
in use. */ 
  dup(s1); 
  sock_in = dup(0); 
  sock_out = dup(1); 
  startup_pipe = -1; 
  /* 
   * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 
2 
   * as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work if 
   * ttyfd happens to be one of those. 
   */ 
  debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, 
sock_out); 
  if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) 
   generate_ephemeral_server_key(); 
 } else { 
  for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { 
   if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != 
AF_INET6) 
    continue; 
   if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) 
    fatal("Too many listen sockets. " 
        "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); 
   if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, 
       ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), 
       NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { 
    error("getnameinfo failed"); 
    continue; 
   } 
   /* Create socket for listening. */ 
   listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, 
       ai->ai_protocol); 
   if (listen_sock < 0) { 
    /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ 
    verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
    continue; 
   } 
   if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) { 
    error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", 
strerror(errno)); 
    close(listen_sock); 
    continue; 
   } 
   /* 
    * Set socket options. 
    * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. 
    */ 
   if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 
       &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) 




   debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); 
 
   /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ 
   if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 
0) { 
    if (!ai->ai_next) 
        error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: 
%.200s.", 
         strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); 
    close(listen_sock); 
    continue; 
   } 
   listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; 
   num_listen_socks++; 
 
   /* Start listening on the port. */ 
   logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, 
strport); 
   if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0) 
    fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 
  } 
  freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); 
 
  if (!num_listen_socks) 
   fatal("Cannot bind any address."); 
 
  if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) 
   generate_ephemeral_server_key(); 
 
  /* 
   * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP.  The handler needs 
   * listen_sock. 
   */ 
  signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); 
 
  signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); 
  signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); 
 
  /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */ 
  signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); 
 
  /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is 
setup */ 
  if (!debug_flag) { 
   /* 
    * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it 
    * easier to kill the correct sshd.  We don't want to 
    * do this before the bind above because the bind 
will 
    * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will 
    * overwrite any old pid in the file. 
    */ 
   f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb"); 
   if (f == NULL) { 
    error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", 
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        options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); 
   } else { 
    fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); 
    fclose(f); 
   } 
  } 
 
  /* setup fd set for listen */ 
  fdset = NULL; 
  maxfd = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) 
   if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) 
    maxfd = listen_socks[i]; 
  /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ 
  startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * 
sizeof(int)); 
  for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) 
   startup_pipes[i] = -1; 
 
  /* 
   * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes 
or 
   * the daemon is killed with a signal. 
   */ 
  for (;;) { 
   if (received_sighup) 
    sighup_restart(); 
   if (fdset != NULL) 
    xfree(fdset); 
   fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * 
sizeof(fd_mask); 
   fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz); 
   memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz); 
 
   for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) 
    FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); 
   for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) 
    if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) 
     FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); 
 
   /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ 
   ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); 
   if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) 
    error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
   if (received_sigterm) { 
    logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", 
        (int) received_sigterm); 
    close_listen_socks(); 
    unlink(options.pid_file); 
    exit(255); 
   } 
   if (key_used && key_do_regen) { 
    generate_ephemeral_server_key(); 
    key_used = 0; 
    key_do_regen = 0; 
   } 
   if (ret < 0) 
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    continue; 
 
   for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) 
    if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && 
        FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { 
     /* 
      * the read end of the pipe is ready 
      * if the child has closed the pipe 
      * after successful authentication 
      * or if the child has died 
      */ 
     close(startup_pipes[i]); 
     startup_pipes[i] = -1; 
     startups--; 
    } 
   for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { 
    if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) 
     continue; 
    fromlen = sizeof(from); 
    newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct 
sockaddr *)&from, 
        &fromlen); 
    if (newsock < 0) { 
     if (errno != EINTR && errno != 
EWOULDBLOCK) 
      error("accept: %.100s", 
strerror(errno)); 
     continue; 
    } 
    if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) { 
     error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", 
strerror(errno)); 
     close(newsock); 
     continue; 
    } 
    if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { 
     debug("drop connection #%d", startups); 
     close(newsock); 
     continue; 
    } 
    if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { 
     close(newsock); 
     continue; 
    } 
 
    for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) 
     if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { 
      startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; 
      if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) 
       maxfd = startup_p[0]; 
      startups++; 
      break; 
     } 
 
    /* 
     * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, 
unless 
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     * we are in debugging mode. 
     */ 
    if (debug_flag) { 
     /* 
      * In debugging mode.  Close the 
listening 
      * socket, and start processing the 
      * connection without forking. 
      */ 
     debug("Server will not fork when running 
in debugging mode."); 
     close_listen_socks(); 
     sock_in = newsock; 
     sock_out = newsock; 
     startup_pipe = -1; 
     pid = getpid(); 
     break; 
    } else { 
     /* 
      * Normal production daemon.  Fork, and 
have 
      * the child process the connection. The 
      * parent continues listening. 
      */ 
     if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { 
      /* 
       * Child.  Close the listening and 
max_startup 
       * sockets.  Start using the 
accepted socket. 
       * Reinitialize logging (since our 
pid has 
       * changed).  We break out of the 
loop to handle 
       * the connection. 
       */ 
      startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; 
      close_startup_pipes(); 
      close_listen_socks(); 
      sock_in = newsock; 
      sock_out = newsock; 
      log_init(__progname, 
options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); 
      break; 
     } 
    } 
 
    /* Parent.  Stay in the loop. */ 
    if (pid < 0) 
     error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
    else 
     debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); 
 
    close(startup_p[1]); 
 
    /* Mark that the key has been used (it was 
"given" to the child). */ 
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    if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && 
        key_used == 0) { 
     /* Schedule server key regeneration 
alarm. */ 
     signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); 
     alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); 
     key_used = 1; 
    } 
 
    arc4random_stir(); 
 
    /* Close the new socket (the child is now 
taking care of it). */ 
    close(newsock); 
   } 
   /* child process check (or debug mode) */ 
   if (num_listen_socks < 0) 
    break; 
  } 
 } 
 
 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ 
 
 /* 
  * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD 
  * setlogin() affects the entire process group.  We don't 
  * want the child to be able to affect the parent. 
  */ 
#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY) 
 /* 
  * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire 
a 
  * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set 
  * controlling tty" errors. 
  */ 
 if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0) 




  * Disable the key regeneration alarm.  We will not regenerate 
the 
  * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. 
We 
  * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. 
  */ 
 alarm(0); 
 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); 
 signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); 
 signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); 
 signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); 
 signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); 
 signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); 
 
 /* Set keepalives if requested. */ 
 if (options.keepalives && 
     setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, 
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     sizeof(on)) < 0) 
  error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* 
  * Register our connection.  This turns encryption off because we 
do 
  * not have a key. 
  */ 
 packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); 
 
 remote_port = get_remote_port(); 
 remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); 
 
#ifdef LIBWRAP 
 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ 
 { 
  struct request_info req; 
 
  request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 
0); 
  fromhost(&req); 
 
  if (!hosts_access(&req)) { 
   debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); 
   refuse(&req); 
   /* NOTREACHED */ 
   fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); 
  } 
 } 
#endif /* LIBWRAP */ 
 
 /* Log the connection. */ 




  * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side 
  * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm 
which is 
  * cleared after successful authentication.  A limit of zero 
  * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in 
debugging 
  * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when 
you 
  * are about to discover the bug. 
  */ 
 signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); 
 if (!debug_flag) 
  alarm(options.login_grace_time); 
 








 if (use_privsep) 
  if ((authctxt = privsep_preauth()) != NULL) 
   goto authenticated; 
 
 /* perform the key exchange */ 
 /* authenticate user and start session */ 
 if (compat20) { 
  do_ssh2_kex(); 
  authctxt = do_authentication2(); 
 } else { 
  do_ssh1_kex(); 
  authctxt = do_authentication(); 
 } 
 /* 
  * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child 
transfers 
  * the current keystate and exits 
  */ 
 if (use_privsep) { 
  mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); 





  * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare 
  * file descriptor passing. 
  */ 
 if (use_privsep) { 
  privsep_postauth(authctxt); 
  /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ 
  if (!compat20) 
   destroy_sensitive_data(); 
 } 
 
 /* Perform session preparation. */ 
 do_authenticated(authctxt); 
 
 /* The connection has been terminated. */ 
 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); 
 
#ifdef USE_PAM 
 if (options.use_pam) 
  finish_pam(); 




 if (use_privsep) 









 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private 
host key 





 int rsafail = 0; 
 
 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, 
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { 
  /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ 
  if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < 
      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + 
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { 
   fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d 
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", 
       get_remote_ipaddr(), 
       BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), 
       BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa-
>n), 
       SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); 
  } 
  if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, 
      sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0) 
   rsafail++; 
  if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, 
      sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0) 
   rsafail++; 
 } else { 
  /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ 
  if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < 
      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + 
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { 
   fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d 
+ SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", 
       get_remote_ipaddr(), 
       BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa-
>n), 
       BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), 
       SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); 
  } 
  if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, 
      sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0) 
   rsafail++; 
  if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, 
      sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0) 
   rsafail++; 
 } 
 return (rsafail); 
} 
/* 






 int i, len; 
 int rsafail = 0; 
 BIGNUM *session_key_int; 
 u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; 
 u_char cookie[8]; 
 u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; 
 u_int32_t rnd = 0; 
 
 /* 
  * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the 
user 
  * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip 
  * spoofing attacks.  Note that this only works against somebody 
  * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the 
local 
  * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random 
  * cookie.  This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is 
one 
  * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. 
  */ 
 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { 
  if (i % 4 == 0) 
   rnd = arc4random(); 
  cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; 




  * Send our public key.  We include in the packet 64 bits of 
random 
  * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP 
  * spoofing. 
  */ 
 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); 
 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) 
  packet_put_char(cookie[i]); 
 











 /* Put protocol flags. */ 
 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); 
 
 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ 
 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); 
 
 /* Declare supported authentication types. */ 
 auth_mask = 0; 
 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) 
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  auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; 
 if (options.rsa_authentication) 
  auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; 
 if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) 
  auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; 
 if (options.password_authentication) 
  auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; 
 packet_put_int(auth_mask); 
 




 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", 
     BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), 
     BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); 
 
 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ 
 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); 
 
 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ 
 cipher_type = packet_get_char(); 
 
 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) 
  packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported 
cipher."); 
 
 /* Get check bytes from the packet.  These must match those we 
    sent earlier with the public key packet. */ 
 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) 
  if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) 
   packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not 
match."); 
 
 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); 
 
 /* Get the encrypted integer. */ 
 if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) 
  fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); 
 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int); 
 




 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */ 
 rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int)); 
 
 /* 
  * Extract session key from the decrypted integer.  The key is in 
the 
  * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of 
the 
  * key is in the highest bits. 
  */ 
 if (!rsafail) { 
  BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); 
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  len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); 
  if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) { 
   error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: " 
       "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", 
       get_remote_ipaddr(), len, 
(u_long)sizeof(session_key)); 
   rsafail++; 
  } else { 
   memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); 
   BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, 
       session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); 
 
   compute_session_id(session_id, cookie, 
       sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, 
       sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); 
   /* 
    * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the 
    * session id. 
    */ 
   for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) 
    session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; 
  } 
 } 
 if (rsafail) { 
  int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); 
  MD5_CTX md; 
 
  logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key"); 
  BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf); 
  MD5_Init(&md); 
  MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); 
  MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 
SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); 
  MD5_Final(session_key, &md); 
  MD5_Init(&md); 
  MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16); 
  MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes); 
  MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 
SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); 
  MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md); 
  memset(buf, 0, bytes); 
  xfree(buf); 
  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) 
   session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; 
 } 
 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ 
 destroy_sensitive_data(); 
 
 if (use_privsep) 
  mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); 
 
 /* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */ 
 BN_clear_free(session_key_int); 
 
 /* Set the session key.  From this on all communications will be 
encrypted. */ 
  u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); 
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 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, 
cipher_type); 
 
 /* Destroy our copy of the session key.  It is no longer needed. 
*/ 
 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key)); 
 
 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); 
 













 Kex *kex; 
 
 if (options.ciphers != NULL) { 
  myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = 
  myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; 
 } 
 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = 
     compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); 
 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = 
     compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); 
 
 if (options.macs != NULL) { 
  myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = 
  myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; 
 } 
 if (!options.compression) { 
  myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = 
  myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; 
 } 
 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); 
 
 /* start key exchange */ 
 kex = kex_setup(myproposal); 
 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; 
 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; 






 xxx_kex = kex; 
 
 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); 
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 session_id2 = kex->session_id; 
 session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; 
 
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH 






 debug("KEX done"); 
} 
 
/*MYSEA: Definition of daemonize function*/ 
int daemonize(int nochdir, int noclose) 
{ 
 int fd; 
 switch (fork()) 
 { 
 case -1: 
  return (-1); 
 case 0: 
  break; 
 default: 
  _exit(0); 
 } 
 if (setsid() == -1) 
  return (-1); 
 if (!nochdir) 
  (void)chdir("/"); 
 if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) 
 { 
  (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); 
  (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); 
  (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); 
  if (fd > 2) 
   (void)close(fd); 
 } 
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 * 
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/*MYSEA: Need to include extra headers to make the daemon privileged to 






 * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: 
 *    1. euid=0, ruid=0 
 *    2. euid=0, ruid!=0 
 *    3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 
 * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has 
 * POSIX saved uids or not. 
 */ 
 
#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) 
/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though 
that 
   is not part of the posix specification. */ 
#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
/* Saved effective uid. */ 
static uid_t  saved_euid = 0; 
static gid_t saved_egid = 0; 
#endif 
 
/* Saved effective uid. */ 
static int privileged = 0; 
static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; 
static gid_t saved_egroups[NGROUPS_MAX], user_groups[NGROUPS_MAX]; 
static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; 
 
/* 
 * Temporarily changes to the given uid.  If the effective user 
 * id is not root, this does nothing.  This call cannot be nested. 
 */ 
void 
temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) 
{ 
 /*MYSEA: variable needed for privileged code*/ 
 xts_privilege_t old_priv; 
 /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ 
#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
 saved_euid = geteuid(); 
 saved_egid = getegid(); 
 debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", 
     (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
     (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); 
 
 /*MYSEA: Change this to be the user the program will run as*/ 
 if (saved_euid != 3) { 
  privileged = 0; 




 if (geteuid() != 3) { 
  privileged = 0; 
  return; 
 } 
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 privileged = 1; 
 temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; 
 saved_egroupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, saved_egroups); 
 if (saved_egroupslen < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 /* set and save the user's groups */ 
 if (user_groupslen == -1) { 
  //MYSEA: initgroups is not implemented on the XTS-400 
  //Comment out for now 
  //if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
  //{ 
  // fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, 
  //     strerror(errno)); 
  //} 
  user_groupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, user_groups); 
  if (user_groupslen < 0) 
  { 
   fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
  } 
 } 
 /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ 
 /*MYSEA: PRIVILEGED CODE*/ 
 old_priv = enable_uid_priv(); 
 //MYSEA: setgroups is not implemented on the XTS-400 
 //Comment out for now 
 //if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) 
 // fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
 /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ 
 if (setgid(getegid()) < 0) 
 { 
  debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ 
 if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) 
 { 
  debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
      strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) 
 { 
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  fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s\n",(u_int)pw->pw_uid,  
   strerror(errno)); 
 } 










 /*MYSEA: Need to add privileges here too in order to change the 
user and group ids*/ 
 xts_privilege_t old_priv; 
 /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ 
 if (!privileged) { 
  debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)\n"); 
  return; 
 } 
 if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) 
 { 
  fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); 
 } 
 /*MYSEA: Enable the Privileges*/ 
 old_priv = enable_uid_priv(); 
#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
 debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, 
(u_int)saved_egid); 
 /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ 
 if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 /* 
  * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged 
value. 
  * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective 
uid 
  * as well. 
  */ 
 setuid(getuid()); 
 setgid(getgid()); 
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 //MYSEA: Setgroups is not implmented on the XTS-400, for now 
comment out 
 //if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) 
 // fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; 
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 * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid.  This cannot be 
 * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective. 
 */ 
void 
permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) 
{ 
 /*MYSEA: Privilege Code here as well*/ 
 xts_privilege_t old_priv; 
 uid_t old_uid = getuid(); 
 gid_t old_gid = getgid(); 
 
 if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) 
 { 
  fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid 
effective"); 
 } 
 debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, 
     (u_int)pw->pw_gid); 
 
 /*MYSEA: Enable Privileges*/ 
 old_priv = enable_uid_priv(); 
#if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) 
 if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
#elif defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID) 
 if (setregid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 




 if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 






 if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 




#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID) 
 if (setreuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 




# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 
 if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 




 if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 




 //MYSEA: Drop the privileges now!!!! 
 set_priv(old_priv); 
 /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) 
*/ 
 if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid &&  
     (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1)) 
 { 
  fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__); 
 } 
 
 /* Verify GID drop was successful */ 
 if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) { 
  fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)",  
      __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(),  




 /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) 
*/ 
 if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid &&  
     (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) 
  fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); 
#endif 
 
 /* Verify UID drop was successful */ 
 if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) { 
  fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",  
      __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(),  
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 *                    All rights reserved 
 * Code for uid-swapping. 
 * 
 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software 
 * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this 
 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is 
 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must 
be 








/*MYSEA: Need to include extra headers to make the daemon privileged to 






 * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: 
 *    1. euid=0, ruid=0 
 *    2. euid=0, ruid!=0 
 *    3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 
 * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has 
 * POSIX saved uids or not. 
 */ 
 
#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) 
/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though 
that 
   is not part of the posix specification. */ 
#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
/* Saved effective uid. */ 
static uid_t  saved_euid = 0; 
static gid_t saved_egid = 0; 
#endif 
 
/* Saved effective uid. */ 
static int privileged = 0; 
static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; 
static gid_t saved_egroups[NGROUPS_MAX], user_groups[NGROUPS_MAX]; 
static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; 
 
/* 
 * Temporarily changes to the given uid.  If the effective user 




temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) 
{ 
 /*MYSEA: variable needed for privileged code*/ 
 xts_privilege_t old_priv; 
 /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ 
#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
 saved_euid = geteuid(); 
 saved_egid = getegid(); 
 debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", 
     (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
     (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); 
 
 /*MYSEA: Change this to be the user the program will run as*/ 
 if (saved_euid != 3) { 
  privileged = 0; 
  return; 
 } 
#else 
 if (geteuid() != 3) { 
  privileged = 0; 
  return; 
 } 
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 privileged = 1; 
 temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; 
 saved_egroupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, saved_egroups); 
 if (saved_egroupslen < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 /* set and save the user's groups */ 
 if (user_groupslen == -1) { 
  //MYSEA: initgroups is not implemented on the XTS-400 
  //Comment out for now 
  //if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
  //{ 
  // fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, 
  //     strerror(errno)); 
  //} 
  user_groupslen = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, user_groups); 
  if (user_groupslen < 0) 
  { 
   fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
  } 
 } 
 /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ 
 /*MYSEA: PRIVILEGED CODE*/ 
 old_priv = enable_uid_priv(); 
 //MYSEA: setgroups is not implemented on the XTS-400 
 //Comment out for now 
 //if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) 
 // fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
 /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ 
 if (setgid(getegid()) < 0) 
 { 
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  debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ 
 if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) 
 { 
  debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
      strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) 
 { 
  fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s\n",(u_int)pw->pw_uid,  
   strerror(errno)); 
 } 










 /*MYSEA: Need to add privileges here too in order to change the 
user and group ids*/ 
 xts_privilege_t old_priv; 
 /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ 
 if (!privileged) { 
  debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)\n"); 
  return; 
 } 
 if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) 
 { 
  fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); 
 } 
 /*MYSEA: Enable the Privileges*/ 
 old_priv = enable_uid_priv(); 
#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID 
 debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, 
(u_int)saved_egid); 
 /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ 
 if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0) 
 { 




#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 /* 
  * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged 
value. 
  * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective 
uid 
  * as well. 
  */ 
 setuid(getuid()); 
 setgid(getgid()); 
#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ 
 //MYSEA: Setgroups is not implmented on the XTS-400, for now 
comment out 
 //if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) 
 // fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); 
 temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; 





 * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid.  This cannot be 
 * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective. 
 */ 
void 
permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) 
{ 
 /*MYSEA: Privilege Code here as well*/ 
 xts_privilege_t old_priv; 
 uid_t old_uid = getuid(); 
 gid_t old_gid = getgid(); 
 
 if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) 
 { 
  fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid 
effective"); 
 } 
 debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, 
     (u_int)pw->pw_gid); 
 
 /*MYSEA: Enable Privileges*/ 
 old_priv = enable_uid_priv(); 
#if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) 
 if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
#elif defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID) 
 if (setregid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 




 if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
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 { 
  fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
 if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) 
 { 






 if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 
  fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, 
strerror(errno)); 
 } 
#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID) 
 if (setreuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 




# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 
 if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 




 if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) 
 { 




 //MYSEA: Drop the privileges now!!!! 
 set_priv(old_priv); 
 /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) 
*/ 
 if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid &&  
     (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1)) 
 { 
  fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__); 
 } 
 
 /* Verify GID drop was successful */ 
 if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) { 
  fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)",  
      __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(),  




 /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) 
*/ 
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 if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid &&  
     (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) 
  fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); 
#endif 
 
 /* Verify UID drop was successful */ 
 if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) { 
  fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",  
      __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(),  
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/*MYSEA: This file provides functions that the unprivileged child of 
the  
 *monitor process can use to communicate with the monitor.  All changes  
 *are from m_recvfd to either m_childsendfd or m_childrecvfd. 
 */ 
#include "includes.h" 


































/* Imports */ 
extern int compat20; 
extern Newkeys *newkeys[]; 
extern z_stream incoming_stream; 
extern z_stream outgoing_stream; 
extern struct monitor *pmonitor; 
extern Buffer input, output; 
extern ServerOptions options; 
 
void 
mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) 
{ 
 u_int mlen = buffer_len(m); 
 u_char buf[5]; 
 
 debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); 
 
 PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1); 
 buf[4] = (u_char) type;  /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type 
*/ 
 if (atomicio(vwrite, socket, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) 
  fatal("%s: write check 1", __func__); 
 if (atomicio(vwrite, socket, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) 





mm_request_receive(int socket, Buffer *m) 
{ 
 u_char buf[4]; 
 u_int msg_len; 
 ssize_t res; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 res = atomicio(read, socket, buf, sizeof(buf)); 
 if (res != sizeof(buf)) { 
  if (res == 0) 
   fatal_cleanup(); 
  fatal("%s: read: %ld", __func__, (long)res); 
 } 
 msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf); 
 if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) 
  fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); 
 buffer_clear(m); 
 buffer_append_space(m, msg_len); 
 res = atomicio(read, socket, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len); 
 if (res != msg_len) 




mm_request_receive_expect(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer 
*m) 
{ 
 u_char rtype; 
 
 debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); 
 
 mm_request_receive(socket, m); 
 rtype = buffer_get_char(m); 
 if (rtype != type) 
  fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__, 




mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) 
{ 
 BIGNUM *p, *g; 
 int success = 0; 
 Buffer m; 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, min); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, nbits); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, max); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m); 
 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
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 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, 
&m); 
 
 success = buffer_get_char(&m); 
 if (success == 0) 
  fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__); 
 
 if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) 
  fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); 
 if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) 
  fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); 
 buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p); 
 buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g); 
 
 debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m)); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 




mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int 
datalen) 
{ 
 Kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; 
 Buffer m; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key)); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd tp childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m); 
 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, 
&m); 
 *sigp  = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 
 return (0); 
} 
 
struct passwd * 
mm_getpwnamallow(const char *login) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 struct passwd *pw; 
 u_int pwlen; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, login); 
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 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m); 
 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, 
&m); 
 
 if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) { 
  buffer_free(&m); 
  return (NULL); 
 } 
 pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &pwlen); 
 if (pwlen != sizeof(struct passwd)) 
  fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__); 
 pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD 
 pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
#endif 
 pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 





 Buffer m; 
 char *banner; 
 








 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m); 
 banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 
 return (banner); 
} 
 
/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */ 
 
void 
mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
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 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, service); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : ""); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 





/* Do the password authentication */ 
int 
mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 int authenticated = 0; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, password); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, 
&m); 
 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__); 








 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated", 
     __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); 




mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) 
{ 




mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, 
    Key *key) 
{ 





mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, 
    char *host, Key *key) 
{ 
 int ret; 
 
 key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */ 
 ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key); 
 key->type = KEY_RSA1; 






 char *msg; 
 
 while (buffer_len(m)) { 
  msg = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); 
  debug3("%s: Sending debug: %s", __func__, msg); 
  packet_send_debug("%s", msg); 





mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 u_char *blob; 
 u_int len; 
 int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ 
 if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) 
  return (0); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, type); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : ""); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : ""); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); 
 xfree(blob); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m); 
 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__); 




 allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 
 /* fake forced command */ 
 auth_clear_options(); 
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 have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; 
 









 * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the 
 * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed 




mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int 
datalen) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 u_char *blob; 
 u_int len; 
 int verified = 0; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ 
 if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) 
  return (0); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); 
 xfree(blob); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m); 
 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); 








 return (verified); 
} 
 
/* Export key state after authentication */ 
Newkeys * 
mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) 
{ 
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 Buffer b; 
 u_int len; 
 Newkeys *newkey = NULL; 
 Enc *enc; 
 Mac *mac; 
 Comp *comp; 
 
 debug3("%s: %p(%d)", __func__, blob, blen); 
#ifdef DEBUG_PK 
 dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen); 
#endif 
 buffer_init(&b); 
 buffer_append(&b, blob, blen); 
 
 newkey = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkey)); 
 enc = &newkey->enc; 
 mac = &newkey->mac; 
 comp = &newkey->comp; 
 
 /* Enc structure */ 
 enc->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); 
 buffer_get(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher)); 
 enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b); 
 enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b); 
 enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len); 
 enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); 
 if (len != enc->block_size) 
  fatal("%s: bad ivlen: expected %u != %u", __func__, 
      enc->block_size, len); 
 
 if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc-
>cipher) 
  fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __func__, 
      enc->name, enc->cipher); 
 
 /* Mac structure */ 
 mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); 
 if (mac->name == NULL || mac_init(mac, mac->name) == -1) 
  fatal("%s: can not init mac %s", __func__, mac->name); 
 mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b); 
 mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); 
 if (len > mac->key_len) 
  fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len, 
      mac->key_len); 
 mac->key_len = len; 
 
 /* Comp structure */ 
 comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b); 
 comp->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b); 
 comp->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); 
 
 len = buffer_len(&b); 
 if (len != 0) 
  error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %u", 
len); 
 buffer_free(&b); 





mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) 
{ 
 Buffer b; 
 int len; 
 Enc *enc; 
 Mac *mac; 
 Comp *comp; 
 Newkeys *newkey = newkeys[mode]; 
 
 debug3("%s: converting %p", __func__, newkey); 
 
 if (newkey == NULL) { 
  error("%s: newkey == NULL", __func__); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 enc = &newkey->enc; 
 mac = &newkey->mac; 
 comp = &newkey->comp; 
 
 buffer_init(&b); 
 /* Enc structure */ 
 buffer_put_cstring(&b, enc->name); 
 /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer 
*/ 
 buffer_append(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher)); 
 buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled); 
 buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size); 
 buffer_put_string(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len); 
 packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->block_size); 
 buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->block_size); 
 
 /* Mac structure */ 
 buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name); 
 buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled); 
 buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len); 
 
 /* Comp structure */ 
 buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type); 
 buffer_put_int(&b, comp->enabled); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name); 
 
 len = buffer_len(&b); 
 if (lenp != NULL) 
  *lenp = len; 
 if (blobp != NULL) { 
  *blobp = xmalloc(len); 
  memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); 
 } 
 memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len); 
 buffer_free(&b); 





mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex) 
{ 
 buffer_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len); 
 buffer_put_int(m, kex->we_need); 
 buffer_put_int(m, kex->hostkey_type); 
 buffer_put_int(m, kex->kex_type); 
 buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my)); 
 buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex-
>peer)); 
 buffer_put_int(m, kex->flags); 
 buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string); 




mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 u_char *blob, *p; 
 u_int bloblen, plen; 
 u_int32_t seqnr, packets; 




 if (!compat20) { 
  u_char iv[24]; 
  u_char *key; 
  u_int ivlen, keylen; 
 
  buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_protocol_flags()); 
 
  buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_ssh1_cipher()); 
 
  debug3("%s: Sending ssh1 KEY+IV", __func__); 
  keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(NULL); 
  key = xmalloc(keylen+1); /* add 1 if keylen == 0 */ 
  keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(key); 
  buffer_put_string(&m, key, keylen); 
  memset(key, 0, keylen); 
  xfree(key); 
 
  ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT); 
  packet_get_keyiv(MODE_OUT, iv, ivlen); 
  buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen); 
  ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT); 
  packet_get_keyiv(MODE_IN, iv, ivlen); 
  buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen); 
  goto skip; 
 } else { 
  /* Kex for rekeying */ 
  mm_send_kex(&m, *pmonitor->m_pkex); 
 } 
 
 debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p", 
     __func__, newkeys[MODE_OUT], newkeys[MODE_IN]); 
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 /* Keys from Kex */ 
 if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen)) 
  fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); 
 
 buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); 
 xfree(blob); 
 
 if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen)) 
  fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); 
 
 buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); 
 xfree(blob); 
 
 packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr); 
 buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, packets); 
 packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr); 
 buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, packets); 
 
 debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __func__); 
 skip: 
 /* More key context */ 
 plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, NULL); 
 p = xmalloc(plen+1); 
 packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, p); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen); 
 xfree(p); 
 
 plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, NULL); 
 p = xmalloc(plen+1); 
 packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, p); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen); 
 xfree(p); 
 
 /* Compression state */ 
 debug3("%s: Sending compression state", __func__); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, &outgoing_stream, sizeof(outgoing_stream)); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream)); 
 
 /* Network I/O buffers */ 
 buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&input), buffer_len(&input)); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&output), buffer_len(&output)); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m); 






mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, int namebuflen) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
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 char *p; 
 int success = 0; 
 /*MYSEA: add socket structures*/ 
 //int sockfd, length; 
 //struct sockaddr_un unix_addr, serv_addr; 
 //char path[] = "/tmp/"; 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 /*MYSEA: Use Pipe instead of Socketpair*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m); 
 /*MYSEA: set up sockets, but don't connect until after the 
message*/ 
 //if ((sockfd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) 
 //{ 
 // printf("Could not create child socket: 
%s\n",strerror(errno)); 
 //} 
 //memset(&unix_addr, 0, sizeof(unix_addr)); 
 //unix_addr.sun_family = AF_LOCAL; 
 /*Set up child socket*/ 
 //sprintf(unix_addr.sun_path,"%s%d", path, getpid()); 
 //unlink(unix_addr.sun_path); 
 /*Bind the child's socket*/ 
 //if ((bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr*) &unix_addr, 
sizeof(unix_addr)) < 0)) 
 //{ 




 /*MYSEA:initialize server socket, but don't connect*/ 
 //memset(&serv_addr, 0, sizeof(serv_addr)); 
 //serv_addr.sun_family = AF_LOCAL; 
 //sprintf(serv_addr.sun_path,"%s%d", path, getppid()); 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, 
&m); 
 
 /*MYSEA: now call connect*/ 
 //length = SUN_LEN(&serv_addr); 
 //if ((connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr*) &serv_addr, length)) < 
0) 
 //{ 
 // printf("Could not connect from child: %s\n", 
strerror(errno)); 
 //} 
 success = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 if (success == 0) { 
  debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__); 
  buffer_free(&m); 
  return (0); 
 } 
 p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 
 strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */ 
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 xfree(p); 
 /*MYSEA: use the new file descriptor*/ 
 //Change both fds to sockfd 
 *ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd); 
 *ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd); 
 
 /*MYSEA: destroy the sockets now*/ 
 //close(sockfd); 
 //unlink(unix_addr.sun_path); 
 /* Success */ 






 Session *s = session; 
 Buffer m; 
 
 if (s->ttyfd == -1) 
  return; 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 
 /* closed dup'ed master */ 
 if (close(s->ptymaster) < 0) 
  error("close(s->ptymaster): %s", strerror(errno)); 
 
 /* unlink pty from session */ 







 Buffer m; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 if (!options.use_pam) 
  fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, user); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 









 Buffer m; 
 u_int ret; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 if (!options.use_pam) 




 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,  
     MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); 




 debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret); 
 






 Buffer m; 
 int success; 
 
 debug3("%s", __func__); 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 
&m); 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__); 
 //change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); 
 success = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 if (success == 0) { 
  debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__); 
  buffer_free(&m); 
  return (NULL); 
 } 
 buffer_free(&m); 




mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, 
    u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 int i, ret; 
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 debug3("%s", __func__); 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m); 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m); 
 ret = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret); 
 *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 *info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 *num = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 *prompts = xmalloc((*num + 1) * sizeof(char *)); 
 *echo_on = xmalloc((*num + 1) * sizeof(u_int)); 
 for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) { 
  (*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
  (*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 } 
 buffer_free(&m); 




mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 int i, ret; 
 
 debug3("%s", __func__); 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_int(&m, num); 
 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) 
  buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m); 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m); 
 ret = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret); 
 buffer_free(&m); 






 Buffer m; 
 




 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 
&m); 
 debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__); 





#endif /* USE_PAM */ 
 









 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsend 







 int rsafail; 
 Buffer m; 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m); 




 rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m); 








mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, 
    char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) 
{ 
 *name = xstrdup(""); 
 *infotxt = xstrdup(""); 
 *numprompts = 1; 
 *prompts = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(char *)); 
 *echo_on = xmalloc(*numprompts * sizeof(u_int)); 
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mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, 
   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 u_int success; 
 char *challenge; 
 




 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, 
&m); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, 
     &m); 
 success = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 if (success == 0) { 
  debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); 
  buffer_free(&m); 
  return (-1); 
 } 
 
 /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ 
 challenge  = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 
 mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); 
 (*prompts)[0] = challenge; 
 
 debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); 
 




mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 int authok; 
 
 debug3("%s: entering", __func__); 
 if (numresponses != 1) 
  return (-1); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, 
&m); 
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 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
     MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m); 
 
 authok = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 




mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, 
   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 int len; 
 u_int success; 
 char *p, *challenge; 
 




 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, 
     &m); 
 success = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 if (success == 0) { 
  debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); 
  buffer_free(&m); 
  return (-1); 
 } 
 
 /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ 
 challenge  = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 
 debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); 
 
 mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); 
 
 len = strlen(challenge) + strlen(SKEY_PROMPT) + 1; 
 p = xmalloc(len); 
 strlcpy(p, challenge, len); 
 strlcat(p, SKEY_PROMPT, len); 
 (*prompts)[0] = p; 
 xfree(challenge); 
 




mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) 
{ 
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 Buffer m; 
 int authok; 
 
 debug3("%s: entering", __func__); 
 if (numresponses != 1) 
  return (-1); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
     MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m); 
 
 authok = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 






 Buffer m; 
 int i; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) 
  buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 





mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key 
**rkey) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 Key *key; 
 u_char *blob; 
 u_int blen; 
 int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, 
&m); 
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 allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 
 /* fake forced command */ 
 auth_clear_options(); 
 have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; 
 
 if (allowed && rkey != NULL) { 
  blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen); 
  if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) 
   fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__); 
  *rkey = key; 











 Buffer m; 
 BIGNUM *challenge; 
 u_char *blob; 
 u_int blen; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) 
  fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); 
 
 key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ 
 if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) 
  fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); 
 key->type = KEY_RSA1; 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); 
 xfree(blob); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //CHange m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, 
&m); 




 buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 





mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16]) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 u_char *blob; 
 u_int blen; 
 int success = 0; 
 
 debug3("%s entering", __func__); 
 
 key->type = KEY_RSA;    /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ 
 if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) 
  fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); 
 key->type = KEY_RSA1; 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16); 
 xfree(blob); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m); 




 success = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 





mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 OM_uint32 major; 
 
 /* Client doesn't get to see the context */ 
 *ctx = NULL; 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, oid->elements, oid->length); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m); 




 major = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 
 buffer_free(&m); 





mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in, 
    gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags) 
{ 
 Buffer m; 
 OM_uint32 major; 
 u_int len; 
 
 buffer_init(&m); 
 buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length); 
 /*MYSEA*/ 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m); 




 major = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); 
 out->length = len; 
 if (flags) 










 Buffer m; 




 //Change m_recvfd to m_childsendfd 
 mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m); 
 //Change m_recvfd to m_childrecvfd 
 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, 
MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, 
      &m); 
 
 authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); 
 
 buffer_free(&m); 
 debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : 
"not "); 
 return (authenticated); 
} 
#endif /* GSSAPI */ 
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APPENDIX C: SSH DAEMON CONFIGURATION FILE 
The purpose of this appendix is provide instructions on how to modify the SSH 
daemon configuration files that will be used by the OpenSSH daemons running on the 
XTS-400.  Section  A provides instructions on the modifications that need to be made.  
Section B provides a sample configuration file.  The key word MYSEA is used to 
identify where the changes should occur. 
A. SUMMARY OF REQUIRED CHANGES 
There are six lines in the sshd_config file that need to be changed. 
The first line is the Protocol option.  Remove the ‘#’ from the beginning of the 
line and remove the 1.  The line should look like the line in the sshd_config file provided. 
The next line is the ListenAddress Option.  Remove the ‘#’ from the beginning of 
the line and change the 0.0.0.0 IP address to the IP address assigned to the network 
interface.   
The next option is PasswordAuthentication.  Remove the ‘#’ from the beginning 
of the line and change the yes to no.  Refer to the sample file provided. 
The next line has the PrintMotd option.  Remove the ‘#’ and change the yes to no. 
The next line is PrintLastLog.  Remove the ‘#’ and change the yes to no. 
The next line is the UsePrivilegeSeparation.  Remove the ‘#’ and change the yes 
to no.   
Refer to the sample configuration file below.   
B. SAMPLE CONFIGURATION FILE 
# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.65 2003/08/28 12:54:34 markus Exp $ 
 
# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See 
# sshd_config(5) for more information. 
 
# This sshd was compiled with 
PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/home/cherbig/bin 
 
# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with 
# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where 
# possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options change a 
# default value. 
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#MYSEA: uncomment the option for Protocol and use only 2 as shown. 
#MYSEA: uncomment the ListenAddress option and change the 0.0.0.0 to 








# HostKey for protocol version 1 
#HostKey /home/cherbig/etc/ssh_host_key 























# For this to work you will also need host keys in 
/home/cherbig/etc/ssh_known_hosts 
#RhostsRSAAuthentication no 
# similar for protocol version 2 
#HostbasedAuthentication no 
# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for 
# RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication 
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no 
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files 
#IgnoreRhosts yes 
 
#MYSEA: Uncomment the PasswordAuthentication option and change the yes  
# to no. 
 




# Change to no to disable s/key passwords 
#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes 
 










# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication (via challenge-
response) 
# and session processing. Depending on your PAM configuration, this may 
# bypass the setting of 'PasswordAuthentication' 
#UsePAM no  
 
#MYSEA: uncomment PrintMotd, PrintLastLog and UsePrivilegeSeparation 



















# no default banner path 
#Banner /some/path 
 
# override default of no subsystems 
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APPENDIX D: KEY GENERATION, CONVERSION AND STORAGE 
This appendix provides instructions on key generation and conversion for use 
with the public key authentication mechanism in OpenSSH.  Keys may be generated on 
the XTS-400 by the system administrator or by the users on their personal Windows or 
Linux machines.  The Secure Attention Key (SAK) on the XTS-400 console is the “alt” 
and “Print Screen” keys pressed together. 
A. XTS-400 GENERATED KEYS 
This procedure assumes that all user home directories are at min:il3.  (level 
$HOME = sl1:il3)  Only perform these steps for users that will be granted remote access 
to the system. 
On the XTS-400, login as admin with a session level of min:max.   




For path enter: /home/<username>/.ssh 
Type no for deflection directory 
Type change 
For path enter: /home/<username>/.ssh 
Type yes to modify mandatory access levels. 
Enter “min” for security level and “il3” for integrity level 
Change the name of the owner from admin to the username of the user’s 
directory. 
Change the name of the group to the user’s default group. 
Answer yes to change discretionary access 
Enter: rwx for owner 
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Hit enter for specific user 
Type none for group 
Hit enter for specific group 
Type none for others 
Type no for display object. 
Type yes for okay to change.   
Type exit 
2. This step is used to generate the keys for the users.  Only one pair of keys 
can be generated for one user at a time.  Before generating a new pair of keys for another 
user, complete step 6, then start from step 1. 
Issue SAK 
Change levels to min:il3. 
Issue SAK 
Type run. 
cd to the “/usr/local/src/bin” directory. 
Type: ssh-keygen –t dsa –f ./id_dsa 
Enter a passphrase.  Reenter to confirm the passphrase.  Write this down 
to give to the user.  
Two files have been created: “id_dsa” and “id_dsa.pub”. 
Move the “id_dsa” file to disk by using mcopy: 
  mcopy id_dsa a:id_dsa 
Verify that the file has been copied to disk with the mdir command. 
3. Issue SAK. 
Set levels to min:max. 
Issue SAK 
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Use fsm to copy the two files, “/usr/local/src/bin/id_dsa” and 
“/usr/local/src/bin/id_dsa.pub” over to the user’s “.ssh” directory created 
earlier.  
 Issue SAK 
 Type sl 
 Type min for the security level 
 Type max for the integrity level 
 Type yes for is the level correct. 
 Issue SAK 
 Type fsm 
 Type copy 
 Enter /usr/local/src/bin/id_dsa.pub as the input pathname 
 Enter <path to user’s home directory>/.ssh/id_dsa.pub as the 
output pathname 
 Type yes for create output file 
 Type copy 
 Enter /usr/local/src/bin/id_dsa as the input pathname 
 Enter <path to user’s home directory>/.ssh/id_dsa as the output 
pathname 
The keys that are in the /usr/local/src/bin directory may now be deleted. 
 Type delete  
 Enter /usr/local/src/bin/id_dsa.pub as the input pathname 
 Type no to display the object 
 Type yes to delete it 
 Type delete 
182 
 Enter /usr/local/src/bin/id_dsa as the input pathname 
 Type no to display the object 
 Type yes to delete the file. 
4. Use fsm’s change command to change the ownership and discretionary 
permission of the files. 
Type change 
Enter the path: /home/<username>/.ssh/id_dsa 
Type no to modify mandatory access levels.  (the levels should be min:il3) 
Enter the username of the user for the owner 
Enter the group name of the user’s default group for the group 
Type yes for change discretionary permissions 
Type rw for owner 
Hit enter for specific user 
Type none for group 
Hit enter for specific group 
Type none for others 
Type no to display 
Types yes for okay to change. 
5. Type change 
Enter the path :/home/<username>/.ssh/id_dsa.pub 
Type no to modify mandatory access levels.  (the levels should be min:il3) 
Enter the username of the user for the owner 
Enter the group name of the user’s group for the group 
Type yes for change discretionary permissions 
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Type rw for owner 
Hit enter for specific user 
Type r for group 
Hit enter for specific group 
Type r for others 
Type no to display 
Types yes for okay to change. 
6. Use fsm to copy the “id_dsa.pub” file to the same directory but rename it 
“authorized_keys2”.   
After the file has been created, change the ownership and permissions to 
match that of the “id_dsa.pub” file.  Repeat step 5 substituting 
authorized_keys2 for id_dsa.pub 
B. PUTTY CONVERSION OF KEYS FROM XTS-400 
For users who do not want to generate their own keys, the keys generated 
on the XTS-400 must be converted before use. 
Take the id_dsa file provided by the administrator.   
Double click on puttygen. 
From the Conversions menu, select Import Key 
Choose the file provided from the administrator (the file name should be 
id_dsa).   
The user will be asked to enter the passphrase for the key.  The 
administrator should have given them the passphrase. 
The key should successfully be imported. 
Click on Save private key. 
Enter a file name of any kind. Save the key to a secure location, a network 
drive or a USB drive.    
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Click save.   
When connecting using PuTTY, specify this new key and not the old one. 
The old key that the system administrator gave to the user may be deleted.   
Safeguard the new private key.  When attempting to use the key, the 
passphrase will be required. 
C. PUTTY GENERATED KEYS 
For users who want to generate their own keys, they can use PuTTY’s puttygen to 
generate keys.   
On a windows machine that has PuTTY installed.  Double click on the puttygen 
icon.  This will open a window.   
Select the “SSH2 DSA” radio button in the parameters section of the window.   
The number of bits should be 1024. 
Click on the “Generate” button in the actions section of the window.   
Follow the instructions for moving the mouse to help generate some randomness. 
Enter a passphrase in the “Key Passphrase” field in the “key” section of the 
window.  Reenter the passphrase in the “Confirm passphrase” field.   
Click on the Save Public Key and Save Private Key buttons in the Actions 
section. 
Go to the “Conversions” menu and select “Export OpenSSH Key”. 
For the name of the file to save enter: “id_dsa.pub” and click on Save.   
This file should be moved to disk or CD and given to the Administrator of the 
XTS-400.   
The Private key should be used when connecting to the XTS-400. 
The Administrator should use mcopy to copy the key file from the disk that the 
user has provided to the /usr/local/src/bin directory.  
Repeat steps 1, 3, 5, and 6 from section A of this Appendix.  In step 3, do not 
attempt to copy the id_dsa file.   
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D. OPENSSH GENERATED KEYS ON LINUX 
Login to Linux system under a normal user account, not the root user account.   
Open a terminal. 
Type the command: 
 ssh-keygen –t dsa 
Enter a passphrase when prompted. 
Reenter passphrase to confirm. 
This will create a directory called “.ssh” directly under the user’s home directory 
and there will be two files in that directory: “id_dsa.pub” and “id_dsa”.   
Copy the “id_dsa.pub” file to disk and give to the Administrator of the XTS-400. 
The Administrator should use mcopy to copy the key file from the disk that the 
user has provided to the /usr/local/src/bin directory.  
Repeat steps 1, 3, 5, and 6 from section A of this Appendix.  In step 3, do not 
attempt to copy the id_dsa file (it should not be on the disk). 
E. LINUX INSTALLATION OF KEYS FROM XTS-400 
Take the private key file from the administrator.  Copy the file over to the user’s 
.ssh directory under their home directory.  If the floppy drive is mounted as /mnt/floppy, 
then use the following command: 
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APPENDIX E: TOOLS 
This appendix provides instructions on how to use the SSH clients and 
information on the other tools used in this project  Section A describes how to use the 
two types of OpenSSH clients used for testing to connect to the XTS-400.  Section B 
describes the tools used for development. 
A. TESTING TOOLS 
1. OpenSSH Client on Linux 
The OpenSSH client on Linux and UNIX systems can be used to connect to the 
ported OpenSSH on the XTS-400. 
Make sure that each user has generated a DSA key pair.  Refer to section D in 
Appendix D for instructions on how to generate DSA key pairs.  The public key must be 
installed on the XTS-400 prior to login attempts. 
To connect, use the command: 
 ssh username@<host name or IP address> 
 When prompted, enter the passphrase for the private key.   
If the login succeeds, a shell prompt is returned.   
If the login fails, a message appears stating that the connection to the host was 
closed. 
To exit, do not type exit or logout.  Use the key sequence of a tilde and a period to 
close the connection: 
 ~. 
2. Putty 
Make sure the PuTTY client is installed on the Windows machine.  Refer to 
section C in Appendix A for instructions on how to install PuTTY.  Make sure that the 
user has a private key that corresponds to the public key installed on the XTS-400.  Refer 
to Appendix D for instructions on how to generate keys and install the public key on the 
XTS-400. 
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Double click on the PuTTY icon.  This opens the PuTTY configuration window. 
In the Host Name field, enter the host name or IP address of the XTS-400. 
Click on the “Auth” option under the SSH category on the lower left side of the 
Window.  Click on the “Browse” button to select the private key file.  A new “Open File” 
dialog box is presented.  Locate the private key file and click on the “Open” button.   
Click on the “Open” button in the PuTTY configuration window.   
This will open a terminal.   
Enter a username when prompted for one. 
Enter the passphrase of the private key when asked.   
A shell is returned.   
To exit, close the window by clicking on the ‘x’ in the top right corner of the 
window. 
B. DEVELOPMENT TOOLS 
1. Fedora core 1 linux 
This distribution of Linux was used as a hands-on experimentation system.  The 
experiments conducted on this system were used to provide baseline behaviors and 
results that were then compared to the behaviors and results produced by conducting 
experiments on the XTS-400.  Fedora Linux can be downloaded from 
http://fedora.redhat.com.   
2. Linux Cross Reference 
This tool works with a web-server to display C program files as web pages.  All 
identifiers are treated as links.  This makes source code navigation easier by allowing the 
user to treat the source code directory as a website.  All variables and functions are 
treated as links, allowing users to quickly navigate to the specific line in the specific file 
where the variable or function is defined.  This tool may be downloaded from 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/lxr.  This tool was installed in the Fedora Core 1 Linux 
system mentioned earlier. 
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This tool requires that a web-server be installed on the system as well.  Apache 
2.0 was also installed on  the Fedora Linux system.  Apache can be downloaded from 
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APPENDIX F: TEST PROCEDURES 
The purpose of this appendix to provide the testing procedures used in the tests as 
described in Chapter IV.  The Secure Attention Key (SAK) on the XTS-400 console is 
the “alt” and “Print Screen” keys pressed together. 
Three user accounts must be created for these tests: demo, cherbig and testuser.  
The username, cherbig, may be changed to testuser2.  In this case all references to 
cherbig should be changed to testuser2.    Their default session levels should be min:il3.  
The mandatory access levels of their home directories should be min:il3.  Each user 
account should have a public and private key.  Refer to Appendix D for instructions on 
how to create and install keys.   
1. MAC POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
Login at the console as the demo user at default session level.   
Create the following directories with mkdir as specified by the directory name 
column in the table. 









Table 25. MAC Policy Test Directories 
Create the following files with vi typing a short text message in each: 
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Filename Mandatory Levels Directory 
test_sl0il3.txt sl0:il3 sl0il3  
test_sl1il3.txt sl1:il3 sl1il3 
test_sl2il3.txt sl2:il3 sl2il3 
test_sl3il3.txt sl3:il3 sl3il3 
test_sl4il3.txt sl4:il3 sl4il3 
test_sl1il0.txt sl1:il0 sl1il0 
test_sl1il1.txt sl1:il1 sl1il1 
test_sl1il2.txt sl1:il2 sl1il2 
Table 26. MAC Policy Test Files 
Issue SAK. 
Type fsm. 
Use the change command in fsm to change the mandatory levels of the above files 
to their respective levels.  Use the  Table 26 to identify which levels to associate with the 
appropriate files.  Make sure all permissions are turned on for all files and directories.  
This can be done through the change command in fsm when changing the levels. 
Use the change command in fsm to change the mandatory levels of the 
directories.  Use the above tables to specify the correct mandatory level for each 
directory. 
Reattach to default session level 
For tests a25 and a29: 
Create a directory called sl1oss. 




Use the change command in fsm to upgrade the level of the home directory to 
min:oss.  Now upgrade the “sl1oss” directory and “test_sl1oss.txt” file to min:oss.  Only 
run Tests a25 and a29 after the other MAC tests have been completed. 
  Refer to  Table 3 in Chapter IV to see what session level to login at through 
OpenSSH and what command to use on the file with the appropriate levels.  For read 
operations, use more followed by the filename.  For write operations use vi followed by 
the filename.  When trying to save, do a normal “:wq”, do not override with an ‘!’. 
When this suite of tests is concluded, use fsm to change the levels of the 
sl1oxx.txt file and the user’s home directory, and the sl1oss directory back to the default 
levels.  This step must be followed before proceeding onto any other tests. 
2. DAC POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
Login at regular session level as the cherbig user.   
Create a directory called “dactests” 
Issue SAK 
Use fsm to change the mandatory levels of the “dactests” directory to sl1:il3. 
Login at sl1:il3 at the console 














Issue the following commands: 
 chmod 777 test_ogarwx.txt 
 chmod 770 test_ogrwx.txt 
 chmod 700 test_orwx.txt 
 chmod 600 test_orw.txt 
 chmod 400 test_or.txt 
 chmod 000 test_none.txt 
 chmod 777 dtest_ogarwx.txt 
 chown demo dtest_ogarwx.txt 
 chmod 770 dtest_ogrwx.txt 
 chown demo dtest_ogrwx.txt 
 chmod 760 dtest_orwxgrw.txt 
 chown demo dtest_orwxgrw.txt 
 chmod 740 dtest_orwxgr.txt 
 chown demo dtest_orwxgr.txt 
 chmod 700 dtest_orwx.txt 
 chown demo dtest_orwx.txt 
 chmod 070 atest_grwx.txt 
 chgrp stop atest_grwx.txt 
 chown demo atest_grwx.txt 
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Use vi to create a C-program, “test.c”.  This program should be the typical “hello 
world” program. 
Compile the program: gcc –c test.c 
Build the program: gcc –o test test.o 
Issue the following commands: 
 cp test test_ogarwx 
chmod 777 test_ogarwx 
 cp test test_ogrwx 
chmod 770 test_ogrwx 
 cp test test_orwx 
 chmod 700 test_orwx 
 cp test test_orw 
 chmod 600 test_orw 
 cp test test_or 
chmod 400 test_or 
 cp test test_none 
 chmod 000 test_none 
 cp test dtest_ogarwx 
chmod 777 dtest_ogarwx 
 chown demo dtest_ogarwx 
 cp test dtest_ogrwx 
chmod 770 dtest_ogrwx 
 chown demo dtest_ogrwx 
 cp test dtest_orwxgrw 
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chmod 740 dtest_orwxgr 
 chown demo dtest_orwxgr 
 cp test dtest_orwxgr 
chmod 760 dtest_orwxgrw 
 chown demo dtest_orwxgrw 
 cp test dtest_orwx 
chmod 700 dtest_orwx 
 chown demo dtest_orwx 
 cp test atest_grwx 
chmod 070 atest_grwx 
 chgrp stop atest_grwx 
 chown demo atest_grwx. 
Refer to  Table 5 in Chapter IV for the tests to be performed. Login as the cherbig 
user at the sl1:il3 network interface.  For read operations, use more followed by the 
filename.  For write operations use vi followed by the filename.  When trying to save, do 
a normal :wq, do not override with an ‘!’.  For execute tests, type “./<executable 
filename> 
3. TPE TESTING WITH FILES CREATED BY OPENSSH 
Login at the console at default level as the demo user. 
Create a directory called “public_html”: 
 mkdir public_html 
Change permissions by: 
 chmod 755 public_html 
Change to that directory 
 cd public_html 
Create the following directories 
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 mkdir unclass 
 mkdir secret 
 mkdir topsecret 
Issue SAK 
Use fsm to change the mandatory levels of the following directories: 
 unclass = sl1:il3 
 secret = sl2:il3 
 topsecret = sl3:il3 
Login through OpenSSH at each network and try to create a file in each directory. 
Login through the TPE at each level and try to view the files created through the 
web-browser.   
4. TPE TESTING WITH FILES MODIFIED BY OPENSSH 
Login at the console, as the demo user, at each network level (sl1:il3, sl2:il3, 
sl3:il3) and create a file in the respective directory under the “public_html” directory.   
Login through OpenSSH at each network and modify the file for the 
corresponding network.   
Login through the TPE at each network level and try to view the files through the 
web-browser.   
5. SINGLE LEVEL LAN – SIMULTANEOUS USER LOGINS 
Ensure that there is a “.ssh” directory under each user’s home directory on the 
XTS-400 and that within that directory there is a file named “authorized_keys2” that 
holds the user’s public key.  Refer to Appendix D for instructions on key generation and 
installation. 
Connect three clients to the switch or network.  Make sure they are on the proper 
subnet.   
Use each client, as a different user, to connect to the same daemon on the same 
network.    
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6. MULTIPLE SINGLE LEVEL LANS – SIMULTANEOUS USER LOGINS 
Repeat the above procedure, but make sure that each client machine is on a 
different LAN and connects to a different daemon. 
7. PUBLIC-KEY AUTHENTICATION 
Connect one client to the network.  Any user may be used for this test.   
Attempt to login with a valid username and a valid private key with a valid 
passphrase 
Attempt to login with a valid username, a valid private key and the wrong 
passphrase 
Attempt to login with a valid username with the wrong private key file.  This can 
be done in PuTTY by selecting the “auth” category on the left hand side of the 
configuration window.  Next specify a private key file by using the browse button.  Make 
sure that the private key does not correspond to the user’s public key stored in the 
“authorized_key2” file.   
Attempt to login with an invalid username.  Choose any key file, but make sure 
that the user does not exist on the system.   
8. MISCELLANEOUS TESTS 
Login at the console as admin   
Set levels to max:max. 
Type ua_edit 
Add a user to the system. 
Edit the /etc/passwd file to include the user’s username, user ID, group ID, home 
directory and shell.   
Before creating a directory, try logging in though OpenSSH.  This attempt should 
fail. 
After creating a directory and installing the “authorized_keys2” file, use FSM to 
revoke all permissions on the home directory. 
Try logging in through OpenSSH.  This attempt should fail. 
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Use fsm to restore the permissions to the home directory.  Use the change 
command in fsm to set the secrecy level of the home directory to sl2.  Change the levels 
of the following files and directories in the following order: authorized_keys2, id_dsa, 
id_dsa.pub, .ssh, then the home directory. 
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